Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors by Worster, William Thomas
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 4
2016
Relative International Legal Personality of Non-
State Actors
William Thomas Worster
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law Commons, Nonprofit
Organizations Law Commons, and the Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
William T. Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors, 42 Brook. J. Int'l L. 207 (2016).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol42/iss1/4
RELATIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PERSONALITY OF NON-STATE ACTORS
William Thomas Worster*
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 207
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY.................................. 209
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF VARIOUSNON-
STATE ACTORS .......................................................................... 214
A. International Organizations............................................ 215
B. Self-Determination Peoples, National Liberation
Movements, and Indigenous Peoples ................................... 221
C. Non-State Groups Participating in Armed Conflict ....... 229
D. Private Organizations: Corporations and Non-
Governmental Organizations ............................................... 240
E. Religious Organizations .................................................. 255
F. The Individual ................................................................. 267
CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 271
INTRODUCTION
unctionalist analysis is now the controlling approach for
assessing which non-state actors enjoy limited interna-
tional legal personality, and thus whether they have the capac-
ity for international rights and obligations. While on the one
hand, conservative authorities might insist that the only true
subjects of international law are states,1 on the other hand, there
is considerable authority supporting the notion that non-state
* Lecturer, International Law, The Hague University of Applied Sciences,
The Hague, The Netherlands; LL.M. (Adv.) in Public International Law, cum
laude, Leiden University, Faculty of Law, Leiden, The Netherlands; J.D., Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois;
B.A., Modern European History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
1. See JANNE ELISABETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 10 (2005); ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
42–79 (2010).
F
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actors are international legal persons. For legal clarity and cer-
tainty, international law needs to distinguish those entities that
are legal persons from those that are not (a binary approach) and
identify which entities are objective persons erga omnes. It also
needs to establish which rights, duties, and obligations those en-
tities hold on the international plane. Although some schools of
thought suggest that once an entity is identified as a legal per-
son, it enjoys that personality in an objective, erga omnes man-
ner, actual practice is more equivocal, andmany non-state actors
exist as quasi-persons or hybrid entities that blur the distinc-
tions. These entities are considered international legal persons
for some purposes but not others, or only in relation to certain
actors but not others. Thus, within the category of non-state ac-
tors, a challenge of personality fragmentation exists: identifying
which actors are international legal persons vis-à-vis existing le-
gal persons and for which purposes they can be treated as inter-
national legal persons. This article will examine the variable and
disaggregated international legal personality of non-state actors
with the goal of discovering how international legal personality
is currently understood.
A survey of various entities and quasi-persons suggests that
the overriding consideration in the international community and
legal system is function. In the field of international organiza-
tions, the functional approach is already well-known for ques-
tions concerning the powers of organizations.2 This article will
identify the international practice of treating non-state actors as
international legal persons and will argue that non-state entities
have personality in the international legal system to the degree
to which they function on the international legal plane. Notwith-
standing Ian Brownlie’s submissions on the matter,3 this consid-
eration is not truly circular. The existing legal persons assess
the actions (or proposed actions) of certain entities and consider
the need or benefit of engaging with those entities as interna-
tional legal persons rather than as domestic legal persons or un-
incorporated entities. From this assessment, international
rights and duties are assigned. This process is reminiscent of the
2. See generally Jan Klabbers, The Emergence of Functionalism in Inter-
national Institutional Law: Colonial Inspirations, 25 EUR. J. INT’LL. 645 (2015)
(documenting the development of functionalism in the law of international or-
ganizations).
3. See IANBROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OFPUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW 57 (6th ed.
2003).
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International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) approach in the Repara-
tions case, which assessed the needs of the international com-
munity and the nature of the entity’s functions to determine
whether the United Nations had international legal personal-
ity.4 For example, once the international community decided
that it needed the United Nations to be an international legal
person, the entity acquired personality for the designated func-
tions in the Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. Charter”) and
in its designated relationships with its Member States. Because
this assessment is necessarily dependent on the entities’ func-
tions and exists within a specified relationship, international le-
gal personality for non-state actors is therefore relative and sub-
jective.
This article will first discuss the nature of international legal
personality in Part I before exploring the legal personality of
various other non-state actors in the following sections. This ar-
ticle will consider international organizations, “peoples” (for pur-
poses of self-determination), National Liberation Movements
(NLMs), indigenous peoples, insurgents, belligerents, combat-
ants, private corporations, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), religious organizations, and individuals. Throughout
this survey, the article will assess each actor and conclude
whether it is considered or treated as if it were an international
legal person on a functional basis.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY
It is well accepted in legal doctrine that some non-state enti-
ties enjoy rights, duties, and international legal personality un-
der international law.5 Certainly, these entities are different
4. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 178–89, 182–84 (Apr. 11) (“require-
ments of international life”); Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons
in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 66, ¶ 25 (July 8); Josef
Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 308
(1952) (accepting the possibility that an entity with unusual purposes, not nor-
mal state purposes, could nonetheless qualify as a state).
5. See Jan Klabbers, (I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and
the Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONALLAW FORMARTTIKOSKENNIEMI 369 (Jarna Petman & Jan Klab-
bers eds., 2003); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48
(1st ed. 1947). Hersch Lauterpacht notes:
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from states,6 but it is important to assess the kind of personality
they enjoy to understand their variable legal nature. The diffi-
culty is that, aside from states, there is no clear law designating
international legal personality.7 Most authorities agree that an
international legal person is an entity with a certain capacity for
international rights and obligations.8 Some authorities take a
less demanding approach to defining capacity, lookingmerely for
capacity to enjoy international rights and obligations,9whereas
International practice shows that persons and bodies other
than states are often made subjects of international rights
and duties, that such developments are not inconsistent with
the structure of international law and that in each particular
case the question whether a person or a body is a subject of
international law must be answered in a pragmatic manner
by reference to actual experience and to the reason of the law
as distinguished from the preconceived notion as to who can
be the subjects of international law.
HERSCHLAUTERPACHT, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 494 (1970); see
also W. E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (8th ed. 1924) (“[T]o a
limited extent . . . it [international law] may also govern the relations of certain
communities of analogous character.”); T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (7th ed. 1923) (stating that subjects of international
law include “those other political bodies which, though lacking many of the
attributes of sovereign states, possess some to such an extent as to make them
real, but imperfect, international persons”).
6. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. at 174, 180.
7. See PORTMANN, supra note 1, at 9.
8. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. at 179; Vincent Chetail, The Legal Personality of Multinational
Corporations, State Responsibility and Due Diligence: The Way Forward, in
UNITY ANDDIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONALLAW: ESSAYS INHONOUR OF PROFESSOR
PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY 105, 108 (D. Alland, V. Chetail, O. de Frouville, & J. E.
Vinuales eds., 2015); HERSCHLAUTERPACHT, General Rules of the Law of Peace,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT 179, 193 (1970); Myres McDougal & Harold Lasswell, The Iden-
tification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L.
1 (1960); see also Case 22/70, Comm’n of the European Communities v. Council
of the European Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 263 (holding that, where an entity
is granted personality, then it must have the normal powers of an international
legal person, such as adopting treaties).
9. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5; see also Award on the Merits in Dispute
Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Com-
pany and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, ¶ 66 (1978)
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others are more demanding, requiring specific capacities, such
as the capacity to conclude international agreements, conduct
diplomatic relations (active and passive legation), and bring in-
ternational claims.10 To some degree, this debate hinges on the
form of participation of the actor on the international plane, both
in creating and applying violations of the law and also in identi-
fying violations of the law.11 This approach also “functionalizes”
personality, moving away from a status from which rights and
duties flow and toward a status that is the result of actions. Yet,
these distinctions between actors that fully participate and
those that do not are increasingly less relevant as new actors
participate in the law in partial ways.12 Further, enforcement of
the law is diffuse and often noncompulsory.13 International law
[hereinafter Award on the Merits in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company];
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
at 187.
10. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3; NIGEL D. WHITE, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 84 (2d ed. 2005); C. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL
SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1974); LAUTERPACHT, su-
pra note 5, at 494–500; P. K. Menon, The Subjects of Modern International
Law, 3 HAGUEY.B. INT’LL. 3, 84 (1990); David Feldman, International Person-
ality, in 191 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 345, 358–59 (1985).
11. See generally Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 IUS
GENTIUM 35 (2005) (discussing the distinction between subject and person).
12. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. at 178 (“The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature de-
pends upon the needs of the community.”).
13. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 286–87. Lauterpacht discusses the
difficulty and lack of capacity to enforce international law, without that prob-
lem being necessarily fatal to the existence of a substantive obligation, He
notes:
It is useful not to exaggerate the importance of what is, in the
last resort, a procedural rule. The faculty to enforce rights is
not identical with the quality of a subject of law or of a bene-
ficiary of its provisions. A person may be in possession of a
plenitude of rights without at the same time being able to en-
force them in his own name. This is a matter of procedural
capacity. Infants and lunatics have rights; they are subjects
of law. This is so although their procedural capacity is re-
duced to a minimum.
Id.
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has struggled to integrate these subjective and relative interna-
tional actors into the international legal system,14 and, following
these capacity considerations, the emerging practice is to view
the entities functionally.
The debate over the law of recognition, while contentious in
the case of states, is largely uncontroversial for non-state actors.
States, as “original” (or perhaps “natural” in a sense) legal per-
sons,15 retain significant discretion to recognize non-state actors
and, more fundamentally, serve as gatekeepers to the interna-
tional legal order. Emerging participants in international law do
not participate by inherent right, as states do, but rather as a
result of states admitting them. Thus, recognition theory for
non-states is analogous to the constitutive theory of state recog-
nition.16 For example, it is not entirely clear whether the limita-
tions on nonrecognition for purported states, such as jus cogens
14. See WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONALLAW 213–15, 234, 247 (1964); HERSCHLAUTERPACHT, State Sov-
ereignty and Human Rights, in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 416, 430 (1977); Hersch Lauterpacht, The
Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 L. Q. REV. 97, 110 (1948).
15. See Legality of the Use by a State of NuclearWeapons in Armed Conflict,
1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ distinguished international
organizations as derived legal persons from states, which are original legal
persons. The ICJ reasoned:
[I]nternational organizations are subjects of international
law which do not, unlike States, possess a general compe-
tence. International organizations . . . are invested by the
States which create themwith powers, the limits of which are
a function of the common interests whose promotion those
States entrust to them.
Id.
16. For more on the constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition, see
generally William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the
State in State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115 (2009).
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violations17 or ex injuria jus non oritur considerations,18 apply to
the constitution of non-state entities.19 Perhaps this lack of clar-
ity results from the dearth of instances where non-state prac-
tices were considered inherent violations of international law.
Generally, where an international organization violates interna-
tional law, it is held responsible under international law, and
such action of the organization does not affect the lawfulness of
the organization’s creation.20 One can imagine a situation, how-
ever, where an organization or other non-state actor is created
17. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 141, ¶¶
132–37 (July 22) (separate opinion by Cançado Trindade). See generally
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7
(Sept. 25); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶¶ 28–
32 (June 30); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶¶ 155–61 (July
9); HERSCHLAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONALLAW 421 (2013) (first
published in 1947); Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on State Responsibility with
Commentary, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, arts. 40–41, U.N.
Doc A/56/10 (2001); S. Talmon, The Duty Not to “Recognize as Lawful” a Situ-
ation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus
Cogens Obligation: An Obligation Without Real Substance?, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc
Thouvenin eds., 2006); Martin Dawidowicz, The Obligation of Non-Recognition
of an Unlawful Situation, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 677,
683 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet, & Simon Olleson eds., 2010).
18. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 270 (June 27); United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment 1980 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, ¶¶ 53–55, ¶¶ 62–63 (May 24); Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth. v.
Belg.), Judgment, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (June 28). See generally Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, at 76 (Apr. 5) (dissenting opinion by Anzilotti, J.); Factory at Chorzów
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (July 26); Mavrommatis Jeru-
salem Concessions (Gr. Brit. v. U.K.), Judgment, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶
50 (Mar. 26); S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 3 (Nov. 20, 1965).
19. Of course, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) sug-
gests that it would (at least insofar as entities that are constituted by treaty).
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of International Organizations, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc A/66/10
(2011). See generally Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al
Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the Eur. Union & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-
6351 (using jus cogens as a means for interpreting the scope of the act, and, not
as a basis for invalidity).
20. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 19.
214 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
for the express purpose of violating international law, perhaps
even jus cogens norms.21 From a purely contractual-treaty per-
spective, such an act would oblige all other international legal
persons to refuse to recognize the new person, but from an or-
ganic or constitutional perspective,22 we might find that the new
person exists notwithstanding ex injuria, and its acts that con-
travene international law impose responsibility. Nonrecognition
of a state in such a situation would be obligatory; but, what we
see is that states continue to engage with an entity, such as a de
facto, non-state authority not qualifying as a state, which per-
haps may even contribute to the formation of international law,
notwithstanding the ex injuria concerns, merely because the
non-state entity is an entity capable of bearing certain basic in-
ternational obligations. For these reasons, we do not usually
draw close parallels between the laws on state recognition, or
the obligation of nonrecognition, and the limited, relative, and
functional recognition of other international legal persons.
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF VARIOUSNON-
STATE ACTORS
The article will now discuss the various non-state actors with
claims to a certain degree of international legal personality and
will identify where and how functional assessments are being
made. This Part will also determine the resulting international
rights and obligations of these non-state actors. At the outset,
we will assess international organizations as non-state actors,
which are viewed by the international community as having in-
ternational legal personality on a functional basis. The article
will then consider various other non-state actors and will deter-
mine, in order from least controversial to most controversial, the
personality of these non-state actors, but will conclude for each
21. See Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1991-I (holding that a
state may not pursue unlawful ends by incorporating an international organi-
zation); Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 19, art. 28 (detailing that a state mem-
ber of an international organization could be held responsible for providing a
competence to the organization that would have breached international law if
the state committed it).
22. For more information on the similarities and differences between the
contractual and constitutional approaches, see Jean d’Aspremont, The Law of
International Organizations and the Art of Reconciliation: From Dichotomies
to Dialectics, 11 INT’LORG. L. REV. 428 (2014).
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actor that personality is consistently assessed on a functional
basis.
A. International Organizations
It is widely understood that international organizations enjoy
personality, but organizations are often understood to enjoy per-
sonality only in relation to the states that create them.23 This
subjective personality can be contrasted to cases where the or-
ganization is understood to have personality objectively in its re-
lations with all states in the world, whether members or not, and
whether recognized or not. Although the ICJ held inReparations
that the United Nations enjoyed objective personality vis-à-vis a
state that was not a member, objective personality is not the
dominant practice regarding the personality of other interna-
tional organizations.24 This does not mean that nonmembers
cannot exercise the choice to recognize the personality of the in-
ternational organization under special law, act, or agreement.25
It simply means that international law does not require non-
members to respect the personality of an international organi-
zation of which they are not a member.26 Thus, the organization
23. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. at 178.
24. See id. at 187–88 (concluding that the United Nations has the capacity
to sue a Member State on behalf of an injured agent, and holding that the
United Nations, acting as an organization, may pursue an international claim
against a state government to obtain reparations for damage suffered); JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2d ed. 2006)
(distinguishing between entities with objective legal personality, which exists
“wherever the rights and obligations of an entity are conferred by general in-
ternational law,” and those cases where an entity is created “by particular
States for special purposes,” which binds only those states).
25. See, e.g., Agreement on the Ariana Site, July 1, 1946, 201 U.N.T.S. 153;
Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement on the Granting of Privileges
to the Tribunal, Mar. 4, 1988, 1526 U.N.T.S. 51; Agreement Between the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross and Switzerland to Determine the Le-
gal Status of the Committee in Switzerland, reprinted in 293 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 152 (1993) [hereinafter Agreement to Determine the Legal Status of the
ICRC in Switzerland]; Agreement Between the Republic of Austria and the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Regarding the Headquar-
ters of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Feb. 18, 1974,
2098 U.N.T.S. 416.
26. See Cass., Eur. Univ. Inst. v. Piette, 18 marzo 1999, n. 140 (It.), Guist.
Civ., 9 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 155, 156 (1999) (“[T]he provision in an interna-
tional agreement of the obligation to recognize legal personality to an organi-
zation and the implementation by law of that provision only mean that the
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can operate and is capable of holding rights and obligations un-
der international law only in its relations with the states that
create or interact with it.27 While this relative personality might
seem to create potentially awkward situations, most states will
take a pragmatic view and will engage with the organization as
an international legal person. When they do not, the relative
links of rights and duties are not so different from other man-
aged fragmented regimes, such as the law on reservations to
multilateral treaties.28
In addition, there are some cases where the very members of
the organization might differ over whether to treat the entity as
an international organization with international personality.
There are various entities that are set up and function in fact,
for example, by undertaking mundane tasks, such as contracting
for office space, yet are not acknowledged to be international or-
ganizations, even by their own members. While it seems strange
that a state might refuse to acknowledge the personality of an
organization of which it is a member, these situations do occur.
For example, entities such as the Organization for Security and
organization acquires legal personality under the municipal law of the con-
tracting States”); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 13,
1993, 1993 JDI 353 (Fr.) (stating that, without agreement, a non-Member
State is under no obligation to grant immunity to a foreign international or-
ganization).
27. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE
ACTORS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS 492 (2006); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 58.
Arangio-Ruiz observes that personality does not arise through formality, but
through actual interaction with states.
In their case, too, international legal personality does not
flow from recognition by other subjects of international law
or from the simple recognition of that international personal-
ity by the member states in the establishing treaty. It is only
when the formal establishment of the IGO [intergovernmen-
tal organization] is followed by its effective possibility to act
independently as a distinct subject that international legal
personality actually ensues.
GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND THESYSTEMOF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONALLAW 246 (1979);
see also Agreement for the Establishment of the Joint Vienna Institute, Aug.
19, 1994, 2029 U.N.T.S. 391 (evidencing a treaty between purely international
organizations).
28. Cf. VCLT, supra note 19, arts. 19–22 (providing for inter-subjective, rel-
ative, assessment of treaty reservation invalidity).
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Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),29 Commonwealth,30 and even
the European Union,31 defy our normal understandings of inter-
national organizations in their relations with their Member
States.32 It is also unclear whether treaty regimes that create
treaty organs, such as Conferences of States Parties and treaty
secretariats, are international organizations or not. With respect
to treaty regimes, potential disagreement exists between par-
ties,33 where some members might treat them as a de facto or-
ganizations and others might not. In the past, even constituent
29. See generally Jan Klabbers, Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft
Organizations in International Law, 70 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 403 (2001) (discuss-
ing forms of cooperation apparently outside international law, e.g., OSCE).
30. SeeMemorandum of Understanding on Co-operation Between the Com-
monwealth Secretariat and the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights ¶ 1.3, Dec. 1, 1998, 2056 U.N.T.S. 389. Paragraph 1.3
demonstrates this unclear legal personality when it reads:
The Secretariat was established by Commonwealth Heads of
Government as a visible symbol of co-operation between
them, to promote consultation and exchange of opinions
among member governments and, in furtherance of the 1991
Harare Commonwealth Declaration and related instruments
of the association, to provide policy advice and assistance in
support of the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values,
sustainable development and the promotion of international
consensus.
Id.
31. See, e.g., Case C-6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 587, 593 (focusing
on the pre-Lisbon treaty phase of the European Union’s existence).
32. See, e.g., Jan Wouters & Sven Van Kerckhoven, The OECD and the G20:
An Ever Closer Relationship?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 345, 346 (2011);
Tarcisio Gazzini, NATO’s Role in the Collective Security System, 8 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 231, 240–41 (2003) (noting that the treaty is silent on the interna-
tional legal status of NATO).
33. Cf. Arms Trade Treaty: United States Signs Arms Trade Treaty on Sep-
tember 25, 2013, U.S DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/armstra-
detreaty/index.htm (arguing that the new Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat will
not be an international organization)
Key U.S. Redlines in the Negotiations: There will be no man-
date for an international body to enforce an A[rms] T[rade]
T[reaty] (ATT).
Parameters: No new international organization should be
created to enforce an ATT. Exports will ultimately be a na-
tional decision.
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organs of international organizations have acted independently
of their organization on the international plane from time to
time,34 a practice that has been supported by certain members
of the organization and which challenges our understanding of
their organizational capacity. Therefore, it is possible for organ-
izations to be subjective legal persons even in relation to their
members.
More important for this article, certain entities can also ac-
quire relative personality as an international organization by
having functional relative personality (i.e., whether the entity
With Arms Trade Treaty, First Conference of States Parties, Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT) Questionnaire for Candidate Cities, ATT Doc. No.
ATT/CSP1/2015/INF.1 (Aug. 12, 2015) (answers of Trinidad and Tobago)(con-
cluding the opposite of the United States, understanding the ATT treaty re-
gime to be an international organization)
4. By virtue of its establishment, the Secretariat assumed
certain attributes of an international organisation estab-
lished by treaty such as independence; the possession of a le-
gal personality; and the enjoyment of privileges and immun-
ities. The Secretariat is an entity created by States Parties to
assist them in fulfilling their responsibilities under the
Treaty. . . .
5. Therefore, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago envisages the establishment of an independent or-
ganisation that has the competence to contract for services
with any other organisation such as, inter alia, United Na-
tions Organisations, regional and international governmen-
tal organisations, universities, private sector entities and
other suppliers. . . .
50. Consistent with the obligations it has assumed under the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad
and Tobago, in a Headquarters Agreement to be negotiated
with the ATT Secretariat, will facilitate the extension of dip-
lomatic-type privileges and immunities to specified senior of-
ficials of the Organization. It should be noted that similar
privileges and immunities have been extended to other inter-
national organisations operating in Trinidad and Tobago.
Id.
34. See, e.g., Letter from the President of the International Court of Justice
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (June 26, 1946),
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=5&p3=3.
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acts as if it is an international organization in its relations with
one or more of its members).35 This perspective even pertains to
the states that are members of the international organization.
In contrast to the subjective approach, the functional approach
considers how the entity is treated and the role it fills to evaluate
whether it has relative personality. If the entity functions as if
it were an international organization, then it may be legally clas-
sified as such. It is well recognized that, while personality can
be explicitly granted in an international organization’s constitu-
tive instrument,36 it need not be, and personality might be im-
plicit in the functions of the organization.37After all, the United
Nations has international personality, even though the U.N.
Charter does not make this status explicit.38Understanding that
personality may be implicit, we then consider, to no avail,
whether there is a universal definition of an international organ-
ization that can be applied objectively.39 Notwithstanding the
35. See Joined Cases C-9/56 & C-10/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority of
the Eur. Coal & Steel Cmty., 1958 E.C.R. 133, 152–54; Joined Cases C-154/04
& C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health, 2005 E.C.R. I-6514, ¶ 90; Arrange-
ments for the Implementation of the Provisions of Article 11 of the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change Concerning the Financial
Mechanism – Legal Capacity of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
and the Global Environment Facility to Enter into an Agreement or Other Ar-
rangement with Third Parties and the Legal Nature of Such Agreement or Ar-
rangement, 1993 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 427, 428–29 (Nov. 4, 1993); U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Institutional and Budgetary Mat-
ters: Arrangements for Relocation of the Convention Secretariat to Bonn, ¶¶ 7,
11(2), U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/7 (Mar. 4, 1996) (holding that the UNFCCC
Secretariat is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations); U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. of the Conference of the Par-
ties on its Second Session, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the
Parties at its Second Session, Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the
Convention Secretariat, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, at 63 (Oct. 29,
1996) (providing that the UNFCCC Secretariat shall have legal personality in
Germany); see also William Thomas Worster, The Arms Trade Treaty Regime
in International Institutional Law, 36 U. PENN. INT’L L. 995 (2015).
36. SeeWHITE, supra note 10.
37. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. at 179.
38. See id. at 178.
39. This conclusion is also supported by the lack of a universal definition of
“international organization.” See, e.g., HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M.
BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALLAW: UNITYWITHINDIVERSITY (4th ed.
2003); C. F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2005); Maurice Mendelson, The Defini-
tion of ‘International Organization’ in the International Law Commission’s
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lack of a specific definition, the essential test for whether an en-
tity is an international organization is if there is a grant of ca-
pacities with meaningful independence of action from control by
the Member States.40 In each case, we must determine whether
the entity in question is recognized as, or treated as having, an
international personality right or rights. Importantly, this exer-
cise is case-specific, depending on the entity at issue,41 and the
personality that results is limited to the functional right
acknowledged.42 Thus, under the functional approach, one can
understand an entity as having international legal personality
to the extent necessary to execute its tasks.
The particular functions we assess in determining whether a
non-state actor has personality are not entirely clear, but there
are some likely candidates. Functions might include treaty-mak-
ing power,43 but could also include mundane tasks. For example,
an entity that is recognized by agreement and has the ability to
purchase office goods and perform other tasks requiring person-
ality must have personality under some legal order, even though
it is not incorporated under domestic law. Lacking compliance
with the domestic legal order, we can only presume that the en-
tity has international legal personality, despite the only consid-
eration being, in this case, the bulk purchase of office paper. Fur-
thermore, such a functional person will not have the full bundle
Current Project on the Responsibility of International Organizations, in
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR
SCHACHTER 371, 372 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005). The definition of “interna-
tional organization” continues to be subject of some debate, but most commen-
tators agree at least that there must be a legal person created under interna-
tional law with some degree of meaningful independent capacity from its mem-
bers.
40. See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Na-
tions, 1949 I.C.J. at 178–79.
41. See id. at 178; Jonathan I. Charney & J. R. V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-
Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’LL. 453, 475 (2000).
42. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. at 179; PORTMANN, supra note 1, at 106; MALCOLM SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (6th ed. 2008) (“Personality is a relative phenomenon
varying with the circumstances.”); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 67 (“The number
of entities with personality for particular purposes is considerable.”).
43. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc A/CONF.129/15 (not in
force). For a discussion of international organizations and international legal
personality more generally, see PHILIPPESANDS&PIERREKLEIN, BOWETT’SLAW
OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 474–536 (6th ed. 2009).
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of international rights and abilities associated with the interna-
tional legal personality of states because it is a limited and func-
tional entity only. For example, the traditional view states that,
although international organizations and other non-state actors
can enter into international agreements, they cannot contribute
to the formation of customary international law.44 Specifically,
the acts of international organizations and decisions of interna-
tional tribunals do not qualify as constitutive state practice.45 It
is unclear, however, why an organization can create treaty obli-
gations but not contribute to customary obligations.
B. Self-Determination Peoples, National Liberation Movements,
and Indigenous Peoples
In addition to international organizations, a variety of other
international actors can bear limited, relative, and functional in-
ternational personality. This article will now turn to these more
controversial actors, beginning with groups that have a natural
connection to the territory in which they live and enjoy limited,
relative international personality on that basis. At the outset, it
might be helpful to recall that there is no reason, a priori, why
there cannot be other international legal persons other than
states and international organizations.46 In principle, it is
simply a choice of the international community which actors are
considered international legal persons.
44. But see, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 25
(May 28) (examining the depositary practice of the U.N. Secretary-General).
45. But see Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Sp. v. Belg.), Judg-
ment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 315 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.)
(“[I]nternational case-law . . . [is] considered an element of [custom].”); Lazare
Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law, 18 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 127, 142 (1937) (“[T]he creation of legal rules by custom by the
action of the international judge is an incontestable positive fact.”).
46. See Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties Between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or Between International Organizations, 2 Y.B. INT’L L.
COMM’N 17, 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1. See generally CLAPHAM,
supra note 27; Peter H. Kooijmans, The Role of Non-State Actors and Interna-
tional Dispute Settlement, in FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE 21, 24–27
(2004).
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First, international law recognizes “peoples” as holders of the
right of self-determination47 and provides a right to receive sup-
port in seeking independence from domination, which may even
amount to a right to sovereignty.48 If the test to be an interna-
tional legal person is some functional vesting of an international
right, then holding the right to self-determination may qualify.49
An entity with some international rights can be considered an
international legal person insofar as it holds those rights.
National Liberation Movements are also accorded certain in-
ternational rights and duties and, thus, a degree of personality
as a kind of agent of the territory they purport to liberate.50 For
purposes of self-determination, a “people” holds this right, and
it is not clear that an NLM holds this right. It might be that an
NLM seeks to represent the people and thus acts like an agent
of the people. NLMs are capable of issuing binding unilateral
statements with respect to their struggle with decolonization,
47. See Port. v. Austl., 1995 I.C.J. ¶¶ 28–32; Western Sahara, Advisory
Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, 32–33 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Southwest Africa) Not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 31
(June 21) [hereinafter Legal Consequences for Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia]; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 1, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR];
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
48. See International Status of Southwest Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950
I.C.J. Rep. 128, 150 (July 11) (separate opinion by McNair, J.) (articulating
that sovereignty is “in abeyance” and will “revive and vest in the new State”);
PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR ANEWWORLD 329–30 (1990); Gerry
Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial
Age, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 285 (1996) (“International law can accommodate
the various claims of the nation, the democratic polity, the indigenous group,
the region, and the colony only when it appreciates the provisional and incom-
plete nature of all exercises of self-determination.”).
49. See PORTMANN, supra note 1, at 272; T. Koivurova, From High Hopes to
Disillusionment: Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle to (re)Gain Their Right to Self-
Determination, 15 INT’L J. MINORITY&GROUP RTS. 1, 24 (2008).
50. See G.A. Res. 33/41 (Dec. 14, 1978); G.A. Res. 35/29 (Nov. 11, 1980); G.A.
Res. 3237 (XXIX) (Nov. 22, 1974); Economic and Social Council Res. 1949
(LVIII), Rule 73 (May 8, 1975); Human Rights Commission Res. CHR/Res.19
(XXIX); ANTONIOCASSESE, INTERNATIONALLAW 140 (2005); R. Ranjeva, Peoples
and National Liberation Movements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS 101 (M. Bedjaoui ed., 1991); M. N. Shaw, The International
Status of National Liberation Movements, 5 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 19 (1983).
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especially statements pledging to be bound by the Geneva Con-
ventions.51 For example, while sometimes spoken of as a Memo-
randum of Understanding, the ICJ appeared to consider the Oslo
Accords a binding legal instrument.52
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is a clear ex-
ample of an NLM that attained international legal personality.53
Initially a project under significant guidance by Egypt, the PLO
quickly shifted to independent operation under Yasser Arafat’s
Fatah organization.54 By 1969, the PLO acquired governance
and de facto sovereignty over Palestinian refugee camps in Leb-
anon under the Cairo Agreement.55 Five years later, the Arab
League acknowledged the PLO as the sole international repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people, which became a U.N. ob-
server shortly thereafter.56 In 1989, the PLO declared independ-
ence57 and entered into the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993.58
The PLO has since exercised rights of consent and the use of
51. See, e.g., Declaration by União Nacional para a Independência Total de
Angola (UNITA), July 25, 1980, reprinted in 20 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 320
(1980); INT’L COMM. OF THERED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1977, at 16 (1978); Af-
rican National Council-Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ANC-ZAPU), Un-
dertaking, in INT’LCOMM. OF THEREDCROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1975, at 8 (1976).
52. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at 138.
53. See Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion,
1988 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Apr. 26); SHAW, supra note 42, at 247–48 (“While Palestin-
ian statehood has clearly not been accepted by the international community,
the Palestinian Authority can be regarded as possessing some form of limited
international personality. Such personality, however, derives from the agree-
ments between Israel and the PLO and exists separately from the personality
of the PLO as an NLM, which relies upon the recognition of third parties.”); see
also G.A. Res. 2248 (S-V) (May 19, 1967) (creating the Council for Namibia, a
subsidiary organ of the U.N. General Assembly that served as the Administer-
ing Authority of the Trust Territory).
54. See HELENA COBBAN, THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION:
PEOPLE, POWER AND POLITICS 43 (1984).
55. See id.
56. See G.A. Res. 3237, supra note 50.
57. See Permanent Rep. of Jordan to the U.N., Letter dated 18 November
1988 from the Permanent Representative of
Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/43/827, S/20278 (Nov. 18, 1988); G.A. Res. 43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988).
58. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements,
Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525.
224 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
armed force.59 In addition, it issued commitments with respect
to human rights law60 and has been held to be bound to human
rights law as a state-like entity.61
Nonetheless, even though an entity has the capacity to enter
into international agreements does not necessarily mean it can
also participate in the creation of customary international law.62
Here, just as with international organizations, states continue
to monopolize the field.63 Yet, the United Nations recently
granted the PLO the right to exercise quasi-diplomatic protec-
tion over several thousand Palestinian claimants before the U.N.
Compensation Commission simply because of the pragmatic
need for an authority to represent them.64 This practice was rec-
ognized, despite the fact that, formally, only states can assert
these claims.65 Thus, an NLM can exercise partial international
rights and create international law through only one of the clas-
sic sources of international law in the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”): treaty law.
In addition to “peoples” (for purposes of self-determination)
and NLMs, there is also the category of indigenous peoples. This
group is not the same as the “people” for self-determination,
which would normally include all of the people of a state. This
group is usually a minority or other distinctive collection of indi-
viduals within a state that has a particular, historic connection
to the territory. While they are not NLMs, indigenous peoples
still hold some international rights, albeit in a more limited
59. See COBBAN, supra note 54, at 43.
60. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Inde-
pendent Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Human Rights Coun-
cil Resolution S-21/1, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (June 24, 2015) [here-
inafter H.R.C. Rep. Pursuant to Res. S-21/1].
61. See id. ¶ 45.
62. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
176 (1999).
63. This conclusion excludes NLMs or other peoples’ groups that also qualify
as insurgents or belligerents. In these latter categories, they might have a
stronger argument that their practice should be considered as contributing to
customary international law, at least in the field of international humanitar-
ian law.
64. See Rep. of the S.C., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2003/26 (2003).
65. See id.
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way.66 The ICJ, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,67
and several states (at least historically) provide that indigenous
peoples can be party to international agreements.68
66. See Treaty of Peace Between France and the Iroquois Indians of the Na-
tion of Tsonnotuan (North America), May 22, 1666, 9 Consol. T.S. 163; Treaty
with the Cherokees, June 26, 1794, 7 Stat. 43; Treaty with the Sioux, etc., Aug.
19, 1825, 7 Stat. 272; Treaty of Cession Between Great Britain and New Zea-
land, U.K.-N.Z., Feb. 6, 1840, 89 Consol. T.S. 473; Treaty with the Potawatomi,
Feb. 27, 1867, 15 Stat. 531; Treaty with the Navaho, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat.
667; Cayuga Indians (Great Britain) v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 173, 176, 189
(U.S.-Brit. Arb. Trib. 1926) (holding that a violation of a treaty with Cayuga is
enforceable due to “considerations of justice, equity, and right . . . and received
principles of international law.”); N.Z. Maori Council v. Att’y Gen. of N.Z.,
[1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) 517 (N.Z.); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 176 (1999); G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007); JAMES L. BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE
118–19 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); David Derham, Theories of Le-
gal Personality, in LEGAL PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL PLURALISM 1 (Leicester
C. Web ed., 1958); Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and
Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,
18 n.106, 20–21 nn.117–21 (1999).
67. See Press Release, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N.
Rights Chief Navi Pillay Urges States to Do More to Respect Treaties with
Indigenous Peoples (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/docu-
ments/ip-day/2013/ohchr.pdf. Chief Navi Pillay argued:
States need to do more to honour and strengthen their trea-
ties with indigenous peoples, no matter how long ago they
were signed. . . . “Even when signed or otherwise agreed more
than a century ago, many treaties remain the cornerstone for
the protection of . . . human rights today. . . . The honouring
of treaties has in many cases been described as a sacred un-
dertaking requiring good faith by each party for their proper
enforcement. . . . I encourage States to take concrete steps to
honour and strengthen the treaties they have concluded with
indigenous peoples and to cooperate with them in implement-
ing new agreements or other constructive arrangements
through transparent, inclusive and participatory negotia-
tions. . . .”
Id.
68. SeeWestern Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶¶ 75–84. In addition, states that sup-
ported the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples implicitly ex-
pressed in opinio juris that agreements with indigenous peoples could, in some
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The ICJ, however, refuses to hold that these entities are
states,69 leading to the conclusion that these collective non-state
actors are a special case of legal person and at least have suffi-
cient personality for certain agreements. For example, Article 3
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) did not
exclude the treaty-making capacity for non-state entities and, by
doing so, perhaps, implicitly confirmed it.70 But, there continues
to be a lack of a clear definition of indigenous people as a non-
state entity.71 Each situation of indigenous people is treated on
a case-by-case basis, with differing arrangements and differing
outcomes following decolonialization, which resulted in incon-
sistent practice. Some of these groups were initially regarded as
having international capacity but were later conquered and
instances, be considered “treaties.” See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 66 (“Indig-
enous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement
of treaties, agreements and other arrangements concluded with States or their
successors and to have States honour and respect such.”). The use of the term
“treaty” alongside “agreements and other arrangements” strongly suggests the
use of the same legal definitions in the VCLT. See also Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832) (“The Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial. . . . The
words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation’ are words of our own language, selected in our dip-
lomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and
well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied
them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same
sense.”); Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1232 (2014) (citing
United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 535 (1900)) (“[O]ur [the court’s]
‘duty [i]s to ascertain the intent of the parties’ by looking to the document’s
text and context.”). Choctaw Nation was a case about “treaties” between the
United States and various Native American tribes, suggesting that even the
current U.S. Supreme Court implicitly views those “treaties” as treaties equiv-
alent to those undertaken under international law. See also Ngati Apa v. At-
torney-General, [2003] NZCA 117 (N.Z.).
69. See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon & Nigeria (Cam-
eroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303, ¶¶
205–07 (Oct. 10) (“In the view of the Court many factors point to the 1884
Treaty signed with the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar as not establishing an
international protectorate. It was one of a multitude in a region where the local
Rulers were not regarded as States.”).
70. VCLT, supra note 19, art. 3.
71. See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 66; Convention (No. 169) Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 1, June 27, 1989,
28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989). See generally Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples”
in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92
AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1998).
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their separate personality extinguished.72 Some actually main-
tained their international capacity in dormancy during colonial-
ism only to reassert it following decolonialization,73 while others
attempted to assert their personality following decolonialization
only then to lose it definitively.74 Some entities were able to
maintain sovereign capacity for a considerable period before be-
coming absorbed by stronger neighbors.75 Some maintained a
72. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Netherlands and Bandjermasin, Dec.
18, 1660, 227 Consol. T.S. 181; Convention Between Great Britain and Mos-
quito, June 25, 1720, 31 Consol. T.S. 233; Armistice Between Spain and Portu-
gal and the Cacique Indians, Nov. 14, 1754, 40 Consol. T.S. 233; Treaty Be-
tween France and the Chiefs of Dakar Respecting Wrecks, Oct. 10, 1826, 76
Consol. T.S. 423; Engagement Between Great Britain and the King of Caleba
(Gambia), May 7, 1827, 77 Consol. T.S. 179; Treaty Between Great Britain and
Biafra (Nigeria), June 24, 1827, 77 Consol. T.S. 285; Convention of Friendship
and Commerce Between France and Old Calabar, Aug. 30, 1842, 93 Consol.
T.S. 475; Agreement Between Great Britain and the Chiefs of Old Calabar and
the Delegates of Slaves of the Qua Plantations (Nigeria), Feb. 15, 1851, 106
Consol. T.S. 183-1; Treaty of Friendship and Commerce Between France and
Dahomey, July 1, 1851, 106 Consol. T.S. 73; Treaty Between Great Britain and
the Sultan of Sokoto (Central Africa), May 2, 1853, 110 Consol. T.S. 267; Agree-
ment of Peace, Friendship, Slave Trade etc. Between Great Britain and the
Sheiks of the Habr Owul (Somaliland), Nov. 7, 1856, 116 Consol. T.S. 43; Com-
mercial Convention Between France and the Touareg Chiefs (West Africa),
Nov. 26, 1862, 125 Consol. T.S. 64; Engagement Between Great Britain and
the Kings and Chiefs of the River Congo (West Africa), June 6, 1865, 130 Con-
sol. T.S. 68; Protectorate Treaty Between France and Sokolo (Africa), Apr. 22,
1887, 169 Consol. T.S. 13; Protectorate Treaty Between France and Konga (Af-
rica), Oct. 12, 1888, 170 Consol. T.S. 342; Protectorate Treaty Between France
and Abrou and Bondoukou (Africa), Nov. 13, 1888, 170 Consol. T.S. 359; Treaty
Between Great Britain and Kawinga, Chief of Chikala and Country (Nyasa)
(Africa), June 15, 1891, 174 Consol. T.S. 428; Protectorate Treaty Between
France and the Chief of Blé (Africa), Oct. 27, 1894, 179 Consol. T.S. 362-1.
73. See, e.g., Terms of a Maritime Truce for Ten Years Between Great Brit-
ain and the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, June 1, 1843, 95 Consol. T.S. 53;
Treaty Between Great Britain and Mwanga, King of Uganda (Africa), Aug. 27,
1894, 179 Consol. T.S. 374.
74. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty Between Great Britain and Hyderabad,
May 8, 1867, 133 Consol. T.S. 378; Treaty Between Great Britain and the Ma-
haraja of Kashmir and Jammu, Apr. 2, 1870, 140 Consol. T.S. 158; Imperial
Service Troops Agreement Between Great Britain and Mysore, June 24, 1899,
187 Consol. T.S. 364; Agreement Respecting Extradition to and from Berar Be-
tween Great Britain and Hyderabad, Nov. 29, 1910, 212 Consol. T.S. 326.
75. See, e.g., Treaty Between Great Britain and the Maharajah of Sikkim,
Mar. 28, 1861, 123 Consol. T.S. 266; Agreement Between Great Britain and
the Sandwich Islands, July 31, 1843, 95 Consol. T.S. 205; Convention Between
Hawaii and Portugal for the Provisional Regulation of Relations of Amity and
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modified and domesticated version of their capacity with linger-
ing, though limited, capacity,76 whereas others maintained only
a pretense to international capacity and today have merely a
symbolic status (usually in the form of a continuing traditional
“ruler”).77 Yet, this practice is consistent in that each case was
approached functionally. Each situation was assessed as a
unique practical case, largely led by concerns over how the ter-
ritory was functionally operating at the time rather than as a
class of cases, and, in this process, the states reached functional,
pragmatic solutions.
One difficulty with determining personality in indigenous
groups lies in assessing whether that personality is “original” or
“derived.” States are understood to be original persons because
they are not created by other international legal persons. Their
existence is primarily a question of fact, resulting from historical
processes. International organizations, on the other hand, are
created by states, and derive their personality and powers from
the states creating them. But, “peoples,” NLMs, and indigenous
peoples are not classified as original or derived persons. In one
sense, they are as “original” as states. Clearly, they are not cre-
ated in fact by states but are instead constituted through their
Commerce, May 5, 1882, 160 Consol. T.S. 209; Convention of Commerce and
Navigation Between Hawaii and Russia, June 7 (19), 1869, 139 Consol. T.S.
351; Postal Convention Between New SouthWales (Great Britain) and Hawaii,
Mar. 10, 1874, 147 Consol. T.S. 84; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation
Between Belgium and Hawaii, Oct. 14, 1862, 126 Consol. T.S. 329; Treaty of
Amity, Commerce and Navigation Between France and the Sandwich Islands
(Hawaii), Oct. 29, 1857, 117 Consol. T.S. 435.
76. See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance Between Spain and the Choctaw etc. (North
America), July 14, 1784, 49 Consol. T.S. 107; Treaty of Alliance and Commerce
Between Great Britain and the Cherokee North American Indians, Sept. 20,
1730, 33 Consol. T.S. 277; Treaty of Peace and Alliance Between Spain and the
Cherokee (North America), Oct. 28, 1793, 52 Consol. T.S. 175; Treaty of Ces-
sion Between Great Britain and New Zealand (Treaty of Waitangi), Feb. 5,
1840, 89 Consol. T.S. 473.
77. See, e.g., Treaty Between Great Britain and Ashantee, Sept. 7, 1817, 68
Consol. T.S. 5; Treaty Between Great Britain and the King, Chiefs and Elders
of the People of Ife (Africa), May 22, 1888, 170 Consol. T.S. 387; Treaty Be-
tween Great Britain and Igabo (West Africa), Jan. 8, 1885, 165 Consol. T.S. 51;
Agreement Between Great Britain and the King of the Abaqua Zooloo (South
Africa), Mar. 3, 1836, 86 Consol. T.S. 29; Treaty Between Great Britain and
the King of the Zulus (South Africa), May 6, 1835, 85 Consol. T.S. 127; Treaty
Between Great Britain and the Zoolah Nation (Southern Africa), Oct. 5, 1843,
95 Consol. T.S. 477-1.
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own original historical process. Yet, they need recognition as
such in order to access those international rights, and those
rights are arguably created by states. The prevailing view is that
an indigenous group or NLMmust be recognized as such in order
to operate as a legal person.78 For this reason, the classic consti-
tutive-declaratory theory argument on statehood79 seems to ap-
ply by analogy. Upon becoming a qualifying group, however, in-
digenous people do not accrue the full range of international
rights comparable to a state but rather a limited range of rights
connected to the function of being an indigenous group. They
also do not accrue the rights of self-determination enjoyed by
that distinct grouping. Thus, we find again that these kinds of
entities can exist as relative, functional persons.
C. Non-State Groups Participating in Armed Conflict
Sometimes overlapping with decolonization and NLMs, but at
other times not linked to those phenomena, are insurgents, bel-
ligerents, and combatants. These entities all have some degree
of effective control of territory through military means and are
acknowledged as persons with whom the international commu-
nity can with engage on the international plane. These entities
are highly organized (e.g., they might even adopt internal “leg-
islation”80) and often resemble states. States may engage with
them, but, for reasons such as mandatory ex injuria nonrecogni-
tion, they cannot acquire the legal rights that come with full per-
sonality or statehood recognition.81
78. SHAW, supra note 42, at 247–48 (“[P]ersonality . . . as an NLM . . . relies
upon the recognition of third parties.”).
79. See generallyWorster, supra note 16.
80. See, e.g., Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Tamil Eelam Child Protec-
tion Act (Act No. 3 of 2006); Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist, Public Legal
Code 2060 (2003/2004).
81. See SCOTT PEGG, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE DE FACTO STATE 26
(1998). Michael Schoiswohl notes:
Still, D[e] F[acto] R[egimes] [(DFRs)] are not accorded full
I[nternational] L[egal] P[ersonality]. Governments seem to
find it necessary to express their disapproval of these regimes
by not (fully) including them in international decision-mak-
ing. Such policies will continue to prevent DFRs from being
fully operational international actors, blocking meaningful
cooperation with them and making it impossible to expect
their full adherence to international norms.
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International legal doctrine recognizes that insurgents and
belligerents in armed conflict directly bear rights and duties un-
der international law.82 The most important duties are derived
from international humanitarian law,83 but they may also be
sourced in human rights law.84 Some authorities maintain a dis-
tinction that only states can be liable under human rights law,
MICHAEL SCHOISWOHL, STATUS AND (HUMAN RIGHTS) OBLIGATIONS OF NON-
RECOGNIZED DE FACTO REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF
‘SOMALILAND’ 90 (2004).
82. See Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Inter-American
Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife art. 1(3),
May 1, 1957, 134 L.N.T.S. 45; Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference: On
Restoring Peace in Indochina, 31 DEP’T STATE BULL. 164 (1954); Paris Confer-
ence on Cambodia: Agreements Elaborating the Framework for a Comprehen-
sive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 31 I.L.M. 174 (1992); Ire-
land v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149 (1978); Oriental Nav-
igation Co. (U.S.) v. Mexico, 4 R.I.A.A. 323, 341, 346 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1978)
(Nielsen, dissenting). Judge Nielsen argued:
The recognition of a new state, that is, the acceptance by
members of the family of nations of a new member, an inter-
national person, is regarded by Governments as a political
question, although the act of recognition should of course be
grounded on a sound legal basis. . . . This of course is not a
case of the recognition of an international person. So it seems
to me that the recognition of a state of belligerency, so-called,
on the part of governments involves very largely political con-
siderations.
Oriental Navigation Co., 4 R.I.A.A. at 341, 346; see also Doe v. Islamic Salva-
tion Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro
Ed Altri-Gestione, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991); SHAW, supra note 42, at 219–
20, 1040–41 (observing that the concepts of insurgency and belligerency are
not easily distinguishable); CASSESE, supra note 50, at 124–26, 140–142;
BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 63 (noting that insurgents and belligerents are both
considered subjects entitled to enter into legal relations on the international
plane); STEPHEN C. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A GENERAL
HISTORY 200 (2000); BRIERLY, supra note 66, at 133–35.
83. See A Guide to State Practice Concerning International Humanitarian
Law, 3 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 518–19 (2000) (reporting on a Hungarian
Supreme Court decision applying common Article 3 to the unrest in 1956).
84. See Ahmed v. Austria, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 10, 44, 47 (finding that
a de facto regime could commit human rights violations); S.C. Res. 1193, ¶ 14
(Aug. 28, 1998); S.C. Res. 1213, ¶ 7 (Dec. 3, 1998); JEANPICTET, INT’LCOMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED
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whereas both states and armed groups can be liable under inter-
national humanitarian law. Thus, non-state groups cannot for-
mally “violate” human rights but instead can simply commit
“abuses.”85 In seeking to place responsibility, some authorities
would exempt the non-state group from collective responsibility
and instead would assign responsibility to another state or state-
like actor that should have protected the population from mis-
treatment.86 The drive to extend the application of human rights
law, however, is functional—to have the ability to document and
identify mistreatment committed by non-state actors, and not
just states.87 One technique for applying human rights law in-
FORCES IN THE FIELD 51–52 (1952); LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF
ARMEDOPPOSITIONGROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (2002).
85. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. S-22/1, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/2-22/I (Sept. 1, 2014). The Human Rights Council condemned
in the strongest possible terms the systematic violations and
abuses of human rights and violations of international hu-
manitarian law resulting from the terrorist acts committed
by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and as-
sociated groups [that] t[ook] place since 10 June 2014 in sev-
eral provinces of Iraq, which may [have] amounted to war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and strongly con-
demn[ed] in particular all violence against persons based on
their religious or ethnic affiliation, as well as violence against
women and children.
Id.; see also N. Rodley, Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 297–318 (Kathleen Mahoney
& Paul Mahoney eds., 1993).
86. See H.R.C. Rep. Pursuant to Res. S-21/1, supra note 60, ¶ 50. The com-
mission was of the
view that inmates were transferred out of the prison and
summarily executed with the apparent knowledge of the local
authorities in Gaza, in violation of their obligation to protect
the right to life and security of those in their custody. These
extrajudicial executions, many of which were carried out in
public, constitute a violation of both international humani-
tarian law and international human rights law.
Id.
87. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 766–810 (An-
drew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014); Amnesty Int’l, Palestine (State of):
‘Strangling Necks’ Abductions, Torture and Summary Killings of Palestinians
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sists that non-state groups comply with any previous commit-
ments that they made to follow human rights law.88 An addi-
tional technique consists of identifying human rights norms that
conventional law specifically extends to non-state actors.89 In
some instances, the U.N. Security Council is relied upon as a
substitute for a treaty.90 The difficulty with this approach is that
the language of the resolutions does not prescribe human rights
for the actors by its own legal act; instead, the resolutions usu-
ally conclude that the group violated human rights law, suggest-
ing that the law was somehow already in existence and applica-
ble to the actor at the time of the violation.91 The final technique
asserts that all actors are held to jus cogens norms whether or
not the groups are subject to human rights law in the same way
as states.92 Since the list of jus cogens norms is indeterminate,
this approach could include a wide spectrum of human rights
protections.93 The more controversial approach includes assimi-
lating the non-state actor to a state and designating it as a de
facto, state-like entity, while also denying that it is a state, thus
requiring it to comply with human rights norms just like a
state.94 After all, non-state armed groups are considered to have
by Hamas Forces During the 2014 Gaza/Israel Conflict, at 35–37, AI Index
MDE 21/1643/2015 (May 26, 2015).
88. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶ 106–07, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012).
89. See id. ¶ 44.
90. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015) (endorsing the non-binding
agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac-
tion (July 14, 2015), U.N. Doc. S/2015/544).
91. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 2088, ¶ 13 (Jan.
24, 2013); S.C. Res. 1882, ¶ 14 (Aug. 4, 2009); S.C. Res. 2031, ¶ 13 (Dec. 21,
2011).
92. See, e.g., Tilman Rodenhäuser, International Legal Obligations of
Armed Opposition Groups in Syria, INT’L REV. L., no. 1, 2015, at 1,
http://www.qscience.com/doi/pdf/10.5339/irl.2015.2.
93. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Mali, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/33 (2012) (documenting violations of human rights by non-state ac-
tors).
94. See, e.g., H.R.C. Rep. Pursuant to Res. S-21/1, supra note 60, ¶ 45 (“[I]t
is worth recalling that non-State actors that exercise government-like func-
tions and control over a territory are obliged to respect human rights norms
when their conduct affects the human rights of the individuals under their
control.”); Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protec-
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the capacity to undertake state-like organizational policy to com-
mit crimes against humanity.95 Thus, the extension of human
rights law to non-state armed groups has a major effect for de-
termining personality. This pragmatic solution gives new appre-
ciation to the way that international persons, such as states and
the United Nations, engage with armed groups, perhaps giving
those groups limited, functional personality.96
Engaging with these groups in this way, however, implies that
the groups may be able to argue for a role in shaping the appli-
cable norms.97 Many agreements exist between states and non-
state insurgent actors98 or between the United Nations and non-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terror-
ism), Fourth Rep. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, ¶¶ 30–31, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/29/51 (2015) (concluding that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
is obliged to respect human rights).
95. See Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confir-
mation of Charges Pursuant to Art. 61(7)(1) and (b) of the Statute (Jan. 23,
2012); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, IT-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 20, 1995).
96. See generally GERARD MCHUGH & MANUEL BESSLER, HUMANITARIAN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARMED GROUPS: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS, AND
GUIDELINES ONHUMANITARIANNEGOTIATIONS WITHARMEDGROUPS (2006).
97. See Marco Sassòli, Involving Organized Armed Groups in the Develop-
ment of the Law?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW. ORGANIZED ARMED GROUPS: A CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 213–21
(2010).
98. See, e.g., Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the Inter-
national Monitoring Team Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the International Monitoring Team, Oct. 27, 2009,
http://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-agreemen-cpc2009; Agreement on a Per-
manent Ceasefire Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the
Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Feb. 23, 2008, http://peace-
maker.un.org/uganda-permanent-ceasefire2008; Protocol Between the Gov-
ernment of the Sudan, SLM/A and the Justice and Equality Movement on the
Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, Nov. 9, 2004 [herein-
after Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur],
http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/protocol-between-govt-sudan-slma-and-jus-
tice-and-equality-movement-improvement; Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
to Protect Non-Combatant Civilians and Civilian Facilities from Military At-
tack, Mar. 10, 2002, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-
maker.un.org/files/SD_020331_Agreement%20to%20Protect%20Non-
Combatant%20Civilians%20from%20Military%20Attack.pdf; Humanitarian
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state insurgent actors.99 This practice is specifically encouraged
by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, although the
precise legal value of treaty-type agreements with such entities
is unclear.100 In many of these agreements, the parties do not
undertake new obligations101 but instead “reaffirm” their exist-
ing obligations under international law.102 Ultimately, many of
these agreements have been applied as treaties.103 In at least one
Exchange Agreement Between Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucio-
narias de Colombia (FARC), June 2, 2001, http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Ac-
cord%2014_16Key%20texts%20and%20agreements_2004_ENG.pdf; Compre-
hensive Agreement on Human Rights, Mar. 29, 1994, http://peace-
maker.un.org/guatemala-humanrightsagreement94; Liberia: Cotonou Agree-
ment, July 25, 1993, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5796.html; Agree-
ment on Human Rights, Annex to Note Verbale dated 14 August 1990 from the
Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doc. A/44/971-S/21541 (1990).
99. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of
Sudan, SPLM and the UN Regarding UNMine Action Support to Sudan, Sept.
19, 2002, http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/memorandum-understanding-be-
tween-govt-sudan-splm-and-un-regarding-un-mine-action.
100. See generally Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the
Admissibility of the Case Under Art. 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009).
101. See, e.g., Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government
of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL, Sept. 7, 2006, http://peace-
maker.un.org/node/127; Darfur Peace Agreement, May 5, 2006, http://www.su-
dantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Darfur_Peac_Agreement-2.pdf; Comprehensive
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians
United for the Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), Aug. 18, 2003 [hereinafter Peace Agreement
Between LURD and MODEL], http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/re-
sources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf; Agreement on a
Ceasefire Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Feb. 22, 2002,
http://www.usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-sri-lanka; Uganda Peace
Talks Agreement for the Restoration of Peace to the Sovereign State of the
Republic of Uganda, Dec. 17, 1985, http://peacemaker.un.org/uganda-peace-
talks85; cf. Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Si-
erra Leone and the RUF/SL (Abidjan Peace Agreement), Nov. 30, 1996,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-peace-agreement-RUF96 (providing ex-
pressly for new human rights obligations).
102. See, e.g., Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in
Darfur, supra note 98; CPN-M, Appeal of the Communist Party of Nepal (Mao-
ist) (Mar. 16, 2004); Peace Agreement Between LURD andMODEL, supra note
101.
103. See, e.g., Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of
Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General Pursuant to S.C. Res. 1564 of 18
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case, an armed group successfully acceded to a treaty,104 even
though this ability is not formally recognized and would nor-
mally require the group to be considered a person with capacity
to enter into the treaty.105
Some of these groups have also been understood to have the
capacity to issue binding unilateral statements, especially prom-
ises to comply with international humanitarian law.106 Some of
September 2004, ¶ 174, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005). The International
Commission noted:
[T]he SLM/A [Sudan Liberation Movement/Army] and the
JEM [Justice and Equality Movement] possess under cus-
tomary international law the power to enter into binding in-
ternational agreements (so called jus contrahendum), have
entered various internationally binding Agreements with the
Government. In these Agreements the rebels have under-
taken, among other things, to comply with humanitarian law.
The NMRD [National Movement for Recovery and Develop-
ment] concluded two Agreements with the Government of the
Sudan on 17 December 2004, one on humanitarian access and
the other on security issues in the war zone. In these Agree-
ments the parties pledged to release prisoners of war and or-
ganize the voluntary repatriation of internally displaced per-
sons and refugees.
Id.; see also S.C. Res. 1127 (Aug. 28, 1997) (regarding UNITA and the Lusaka
Protocol).
104. See Instruments of Accession of the Algerian Republic to the Geneva Con-
ventions of August 12, 1949, in M. BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN
REVOLUTION 199 (1961) (stating that the instrument was deposited by the Pro-
visional Government of Algeria prior to attaining effective control or interna-
tional recognition); cf. Nat’l Democratic Front of the Phil. [NDFP], Declaration
of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977,
NDFP.ORG (July 5, 1996), https://www.ndfp.org/ndfp-declaration-of-undertak-
ing-to-apply-the-geneva-conventions-of-1949-and-protocol-i-of-1977/ (declar-
ing that the National Democratic Front of the Philippines will merely apply
the conventions but will not attempt to adhere to the conventions).
105. See Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) & SCSL-
2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Am-
nesty, ¶¶ 45–50 (Mar. 13, 2004). But see A. Cassese, The Special Court and
International Law: The Decision Concerning the Lomé Agreement Amnesty, 2
J. INT’LCRIM. JUST. 1130, 1134–35 (2004).
106. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 91 (noting the PLO declaration); Pros-
ecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 627 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting the
Rwandese Patriotic Front declaration to the International Committee of the
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these promises were made to the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC)107 and others to the United Nations.108 More
important than these specific agreements or unilateral commit-
ments, however, is whether the practice of non-state actors con-
tributes to customary international law. Some scholars and
courts look to the practice of non-state actors to establish or
prove the rules of customary international law.109 For example,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has taken into account the practice of non-state actors in
Red Cross (ICRC)); Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and Summary Execu-
tions, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 (Mar. 27, 2006); Olara Otunnu
(Special Rapporteur), Additional Rep. of the Special Representative of the Sec-
retary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/71 (Feb. 9, 2000); UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN
AFGHANISTAN [UNAMA], AFGHANISTAN: MIDYEAR REPORT 2011 PROTECTION OF
CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT 11–13 (2011) (documenting the Taliban’s decla-
rations and Code of Conduct).
107. See, e.g., B. W. Ndiaye (Special Rapporteur), Question of the Violation of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Par-
ticular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories, ¶
26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 (Aug. 11, 1993) (“For its part, the FPR
[Rwandese Patriotic Front] has stated to the International Committee of the
Red Cross that it considers itself bound by the rules of international humani-
tarian law.”); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1985, at 36
(1986), https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/RA_CICR/RA_1985_ENG.pdf; INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1967, at 36 (1968), https://li-
brary.icrc.org/library/docs/RA_CICR/RA_1967_ENG.pdf.
108. See, e.g., Letter from Velummylum Manoharan, Representative, Liber-
ation Tigers Tamil Eelam International Secretariat, to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit (Nov. 16, 1997), http://www.sun-
daytimes.lk/971116/news2.html; PKK Statement to the United Nations (Jan.
24, 1995), http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/009.html; NDFP, supra
note 104.
109. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 100 (separate opinion by Ammoun,
J.); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at 74 (dissenting opinion by Ammoun, J.) (“If there
is any ‘general practice’ which might be held, beyond dispute, to constitute law
within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1 (b), of the Statute of the Court,
it must surely be that which is made up of the conscious action of the peoples
themselves, engaged in a determined struggle [for self-determination].”); L. C.
CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-
ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 344 (2d ed. 2000); Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Siva-
kumaran, Lawmaking by Non-state Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Cre-
ation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 118–19
(2012).
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assessing customary international law (albeit, in a limited man-
ner).110 Since the ICJ Statute only requires that the practice be
accepted as law and does not limit acceptance of the provision to
states,111 there may be some plausibility to this argument.112
Some have even suggested that non-state armed groups are de-
veloping their own law of armed conflict parallel to that of
states.113 Most authorities, such as the International Law Com-
mission (ILC), however, maintain that only states may contrib-
ute to the formation of customary international law.114 Thus,
while the ICRC documents the practice of armed groups, it dis-
tinguishes it from the practice of states with respect to establish-
ing customary international law because of the uncertainty in
110. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 102–07 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Luisa Vierucci, ‘Special Agreements’ Be-
tween Conflicting Parties in the Case-Law of the ICTY, in THE LEGACY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 401 (Bert
Swart, Alexander Zahar, & Göran Sluiter eds., 2011).
111. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
112. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judg-
ment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 155 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion by Van den
Wyngaert, J.); Legal Consequences for Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 69–70, 74 (dissenting opinion by Ammoun, J.).
113. See generally Sophie Rondeau, Participation of Armed Groups in the De-
velopment of the Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
649 (2011).
114. See, e.g., Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on Identifica-
tion of Customary Int’l Law, Draft Conclusion 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May
22, 2014) as amended by Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on
Identification of Customary Int’l Law, Draft Conclusion 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/682 (Mar. 27, 2015); AREND, supra note 62; Jean d’Aspermont, Conclu-
sion: Inclusive Law-making and Law-enforcement Processes for an Exclusive
International Legal System, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: MULTIPLEPERSPECTIVES ONNON-STATEACTORS IN INTERNATIONALLAW
425, 430 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2013).
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qualifying actors in the rules needed to form customary interna-
tional law.115 In any event, the precise normative effect of insur-
gent practice is not settled, but it is informative of the applica-
bility of international humanitarian law.116
Underlying this practice is simply the functional need to en-
sure the protection of civilian populations by holding combatants
to certain minimum legal obligations. Belligerents need to be
covered by international humanitarian law in order to minimize
the suffering of civilians and participants,117 but we do not want
the combatants to enjoy the benefits of statehood or claim igno-
rance of jus cogens violations.118 Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions commands that the application of the Article “shall
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.”119 What
we find in this practice is that, occasionally, non-state actors are
treated as if they have international legal personality depending
on whether they are engaging with issues of international hu-
manitarian law, thus creating a relativist, functional personal-
ity. This is the logical result of the theory of the “equality of bel-
ligerents”120—that, for purposes of effective and practical appli-
cation of a uniform code of the law of armed conflict, insurgents
should be treated equally to the states they are fighting against.
Highlighting their relative nature, however, it is more debata-
ble when analyzing whether prohibitions on the use of force, spe-
cifically Article 2, Section 4 of the U.N. Charter, apply to armed
115. See JEAN MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONALHUMANITARIAN LAW xxxvi, 64, 77, 115, 126, 356, 412, 778, 870,
2882, 3610 (2009); Jean Marie Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups
Through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law, COLLEGIUM, no. 27,
2003, at 123, https://www.coleurope.eu/content/publications/pdf/Colle-
gium27.pdf.
116. See Richard R. Baxter, The First Modern Codification of the Law of War,
3 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 171 (1963).
117. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 265–341.
118. This, however, does not mean that DFRs have no international rights or
obligations: “‘[I]nternational law has (…) developed some rudimentary mecha-
nisms to ensure that the developments on the ground are not entirely left to
the (domestic) ‘laws’ of anarchy.’” Jonte van Essen, De Facto Regimes in Inter-
national Law, 28 MERKOURIOS–UTRECHT J. INT’L&EUR. L., no. 75, 2012, at 31,
34 (citing SHAW, supra note 2, at 55).
119. See JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OFWAR 43–44 (1960).
120. See Jonathan Somer, Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality
of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
655, 687 (2007).
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groups.121 Some authorities now argue that, where insurgents
have sufficient independent control and organize themselves
into a de facto regime, they are state-like and may benefit from
the prohibition on the use of force against states.122 Strictly
speaking, the rule only covers “states,” and states can normally
exercise their police function to resist civil war.123Yet, it may be
argued that the term “state” is not the same as “U.N. mem-
ber;”124 thus, any insurgent group that operates a de facto state
may qualify.125 The Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IFFMCG), an inquiry body
established by the Council of the European Union to investigate
the conflict in Georgia, found that the South Ossetia and Abkha-
zia entities, while not states, were “state-like” and thus covered
by the prohibition on the use of force.126 Similarly, the Office of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has con-
cluded that such state-like entities are capable of coordinated
121. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); SHAW, supra note 42, at 1123. For the possible
prohibitions on the use of force by a state against a non-state actor, see Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judg-
ment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 112;
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN
GEORGIAREPORT 39–43 (2009) [hereinafter IIFFMCG REPORT ON THECONFLICT
INGEORGIA], http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_II1.pdf.
122. See OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE
USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (2010); CASSESE, su-
pra note 50, at 157.
123. See IIFFMCG REPORT ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA, supra note 121, at
239–42.
124. For example, the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics
were not states when they were admitted to the United Nations. See
CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 45, n.37. On the other hand, Switzerland has al-
ways been considered a state even when it was not a U.N. Member State. See
id. at 193.
125. See generally Anthony Cullen & Steven Wheatley, The Human Rights of
Individuals in De Facto Regimes Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 691 (2013); Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive Ver-
sus The Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?, 75 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 101, 104 (2004).
126. See IIFFMCG REPORT ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA, supra note 121, at
239–42.
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policy sufficient for crimes against humanity.127 These cases,
however, are not isolated. For example, James Crawford has ap-
plied the prohibition on the use of force to the relations between
the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Tai-
wan,128 and the U.N. Security Council has held that use of force
between North and South Korea—which were not considered in-
dependent states at the time—was also covered by the prohibi-
tion on the use of force.129 Again, a functional, pragmatic ap-
proach is taken because what matters is whether the entity con-
trols territory comparable to a state.130 The international legal
personality of these entities, however, is understood to be rela-
tive to their nature, role, functions, and duties.131
D. Private Organizations: Corporations and Non-Governmental
Organizations
Other organizations are increasingly considered international
persons for limited, functional purposes. These entities can for-
mally be private entities, such as corporations or universities,
and can be incorporated in several different ways, including by
states, individuals, and domestic law, but can also be created by
treaty.132As will be discussed below, there does not appear to be
any barrier to granting personality rights to nontraditional bear-
ers of personality where the international community deems it
appropriate.133
127. See generally Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15, Request for Authorisation
of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/15-4-Corr2.
128. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 191.
129. See id. at 470; S.C. Res. 82 (June 25, 1950); S.C. Res. 83 (June 27, 1950);
S.C. Res. 84 (July 7, 1950); Tom Miles, North Korea Threatens South with “Fi-
nal Destruction,” REUTERS (Feb 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2013/02/19/us-nkorea-threat-idUSBRE91I0J520130219 (reporting on the
threat of a “final destruction” by North Korea against South Korea at the U.N.
Conference on Disarmament in 2013 and the reactions of the governments of
South Korea, France, Germany, Spain, Poland, the United States, and Britain
that the threat was a breach of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter).
130. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 39 (1987); PEGG, supra note 81.
131. See Rondeau, supra note 113.
132. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the University for
Peace, Mar. 29, 1982, 1288 U.N.T.S. 3.
133. See NIJMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (defining international legal personality
and providing an extensive theoretical overview of this concept).
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States can create private organizations through either treaty
or domestic law. For example, the creation of the University for
Peace was based on U.N. General Assembly Resolutions134 (and
remains intimately linked to, though not a part of, the United
Nations135) and a subsequent treaty.136Afterward, the university
entered into a headquarters agreement with Costa Rica137 that
recognized it as an “international institution”138 with “the legal
status necessary to enable it to fulfil its purposes and objec-
tives.”139 Its headquarters are deemed inviolable,140 and the in-
stitution and staff enjoy certain immunities akin to those of the
United Nations.141Despite its appearance and functions, this en-
tity is not an NGO under domestic law but instead is an inter-
national organization.
States create corporations under domestic law, and they are
more clearly understood as normal domestic entities;142 however,
134. See G.A. Res. 34/111 (Dec. 14, 1979); G.A. Res. 35/55 (Dec. 5, 1980).
135. See Use of the United Nations Flag—United Nations Flag Code and Reg-
ulations Implementing the Code—United Nations Sponsorship of Events Orga-
nized by Groups or Individuals Not Officially Connected with the Organization,
1983 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 163, 212, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/21; Rules Governing
the Use and Display of Distinctive Emblems by United Nations Organs—Prac-
tice of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in this Regard, 1981 U.N.
JURID. Y.B. 142, 154–55, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/19.
136. See International Agreement for the Establishment of the University for
Peace and with the Charter of the University for Peace, Mar. 29, 1982, 1223
U.N.T.S. 87.
137. See Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the University for
Peace, supra note 132; see also Agreement Between the Government of the Re-
public of Colombia and the University for Peace for the Establishment of a
World Research and Training Centre for Conflict Settlement, July 30, 1986,
2272 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter Agreement for the Establishment of a World
Research Centre] (describing the process of entering into agreements with
states other than the host state).
138. See Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the University for
Peace, supra note 132, pmbl., arts. 2, 5, 6, 8.
139. See id. art. 2.
140. See id. art. 5.
141. See id. art 8.
142. Although some authorities have even viewed these entities as having
“limited international legal personality.” See, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, The
Future of International Law in its Administrative Mode, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 64 (2011–2012). For example, “[t]hese organizations included public in-
ternational utility corporations with limited international legal personality,
such as the Scandinavian Airlines System (“SAS”), the Basel-Mulhouse Air-
port, the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Company, the International Moselle Com-
pany, and the Central African Power Corporation.” Id. at 66.
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this is not always the case. Where a treaty forms the basis for
the agreement to incorporate under domestic law, the corpora-
tion might function as an international organization. Both the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)143 and Eurofirma144
technically are regarded as domestic corporations created by
treaties but incorporated under domestic law and are considered
de facto international legal persons. The BIS was initially estab-
lished to facilitate German reparations under the Versailles
Treaty and unusually included private corporations as parties to
the treaty alongside states. Despite the participation of private
corporations, who are mere domestic legal persons, as parties to
BIS Convention, that participation does not appear to have
changed the convention’s status as a treaty. Although, perhaps
we can wonder whether JP Morgan Bank is now a quasi-inter-
national person.
Similarly, states sometimes create NGOs by treaty yet incor-
porate under domestic law, and those entities can function as
international persons. In order to discharge the international re-
lations between the United States and Taiwan without endan-
gering the one-China policy, the United States and Taiwan mu-
tually incorporated NGOs within each other’s domestic legal sys-
tems. 145 These NGOs are staffed by diplomats and empowered
143. See Convention Respecting the Bank for International Settlements, Jan.
20, 1930, 104 L.N.T.S. 441; Constituent Charter of the Bank for International
Settlements, Jan. 20, 1930, 104 L.N.T.S. 445; Horst Reineccius (Claim No. 1)
et al. v. Bank for Int’l Settlements, 23 R.I.A.A. 183, ¶ 108 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2002).
144. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 66–67 (discussing Eurofirma, the Euro-
pean Company for the Financing of Railroad Rolling Stock).
145. See Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979);
Agreement on Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities Between the American
Institute in Taiwan and Cultural Representative Office in the United States,
Feb. 4, 2013, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/ait-taiwan/171414/ait-tecro-
2013/20130204—agmt-on-privileges-exemptions-immunities-english.pdf (re-
placing the 1980 Agreement on Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities Be-
tween the American Institute in Taiwan and Cultural Representative Office in
the United States). The “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
in the United States,” which is the de facto embassy of the Republic of China,
receives privileges and immunities, a grant not enjoyed by any other NGO in
the United States. Moreover, the grant is authorized not by the U.S. govern-
ment but by another NGO, the “American Institute in Taiwan,” which is the
de facto embassy of the United States in Taipei.
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to issue visas among other acts.146 This situation is unusual,
though not completely unique,147 but there are examples of
NGOs that are not mere diplomatic fig leafs acting as interna-
tional persons. Like the BIS, the participation of a noninterna-
tional person in the formation of the NGO does not necessarily
result in either defeating the international personality of the
new entity or raising the noninternational person to the inter-
national plane. For example, the Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunization (GAVI)148 and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (“Global Fund”)149 appear to be
well positioned to enjoy enhanced personality in the near future.
Similar to the treatment of the Global Fund,150 GAVI is already
considered an international legal person by Switzerland, though
only for purposes of its headquarters agreement.151 Yet, GAVI
146. See, e.g., Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14
(1979); Exec. Order. No. 13014, Maintaining Unofficial Relations with the Peo-
ple on Taiwan, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,963 (Aug. 15, 1996).
147. Another example would be the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Of-
fice (AMRO), which was incorporated under Singaporean law to discharge “sov-
ereign” macroeconomic and monetary analysis duties conferred on it by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See Chien-Huei Wu, Monetary Coop-
eration in the East Asian Context: Progress and Challenges, 8 ASIAN J. WTO&
INT’LHEALTH L. & POL’Y 583 (2013).
148. For more information, see Davinia Aziz’s excellent article on the pres-
sure to extend privileges and immunities to GAVI and other similar organiza-
tions on functional grounds. See Davinia Abdul Aziz, Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Global Public-Private Partnerships: A Case Study of the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis andMalaria, 6 INT’LORG. L. REV. 383 (2009); see also
Gian Luca Burci, Public/Private Partnerships in the Public Health Sector, 6
INT’LORG. L. REV. 359, 380 (2009).
149. See G.A. Res. 64/122, at 586 (Dec. 16, 2009) (granting the Global Fund
observer status). For more detailed reasoning on how it qualifies as such, see
U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/144 (July 14, 2009).
150. See Agreement Between the Swiss Federal Council and the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in View of Determining the Legal
Status of the Global Fund in Switzerland, June 23, 2009, Global Fund Doc.
GF/B8/7 [hereinafter Agreement Between Switzerland and the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS].
151. See id. Not only is GAVI functionally an international legal person in
the view of Swiss law, it is, relatively, an international legal person in that the
United States does not regard it as an international legal person at all. This
situation results in the odd arrangement where GAVI staff in Switzerland en-
joy immunities but those seconded to the office in Washington, D.C. do not. For
its part, GAVI appears to consider itself an international organization. About
Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/about/ (last visited Sept.
14, 2016) (“Created in 2000, Gavi is an international organisation - a global
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might be better understood as a public-private partnership, as it
brings together various actors, such as the U.N. Children’s Fund
(“UNICEF”), International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (“World Bank”), World Health Organization (WHO), and
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.152 Of course, there is no
serious debate over whether the Bill & Melinda Gates Founda-
tion is an international person, as it has never sought the kind
of role and engagement typical of that status.
The situation changes, however, when the private entity is in-
corporated purely by individuals without state participation—
though there are exceptions here as well. Normally, domestic
NGOs and corporations are not considered international per-
sons. Previously, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, the
ICJ did not recognize an agreement between a corporation and
a state as a treaty.153 The question before the ICJ in that case
was not whether the agreement was legally binding between in-
ternational persons but rather if the ICJ would have jurisdiction
over an agreement between a private company and the state of
Iran.154 Since a corporation cannot be a party to the ICJ Statute,
the case was easily dismissed, but the dismissal of the case can-
not necessarily be understood as a refusal to consider the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company as an international legal person. There
may be other reasons why it is not, but the result in this case
does not definitively answer that particular question.
The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs has been cautious about the
subject of new non-state international legal persons, although it
did opine that autonomous public entities that are not them-
selves international legal persons might be able to constitute an
international legal person.155 Despite this position, it is increas-
ingly being argued that a corporation can be held responsible for
international crimes under international law. Usually, individ-
uals, not corporations, are held responsible under international
Vaccine Alliance, bringing together public and private sectors with the shared
goal.”). It may be, however, that this text was not vetted by GAVI counsel.
152. See Board Composition, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/about/govern-
ance/gavi-board/composition/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017); GAVI ALLIANCE BY-
LAWS (June 18–19, 2014), http://www.gavi.org/library/gavi-documents/le-
gal/gavi-alliance-by-laws/.
153. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 93,
112 (July 22).
154. See id. at 103.
155. See Study Prepared for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East, 1971 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 215–18, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/9.
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criminal law.156 Certainly, entities like Greenpeace are legal per-
sons in their respective domestic legal orders, and perhaps even
enjoy certain rights aimed at natural persons;157 but, thus far,
they do not appear to be treated as international legal persons.
This position, however, appears to be on the cusp of potentially
shifting. One of the more important recent developments in this
regard was the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) decision with
respect to contempt against a corporation.158 The STL Prosecu-
tor charged not only Karma Al Khayat, an individual, but also
New TV SAL (Al Jadeed TV), a corporation, with contempt of the
STL. In interpreting the term “person” in STL Rule 60 bis, the
STL found that the term could include either natural or legal
persons.159 The tribunal noted the changing nature of corpora-
tions in the international area in support of its decision,160 and
thus analyzed the situation from a functional perspective.161
Shifting from corporations to NGOs, certain NGOs created by
private individuals also enjoy a degree of relative personality,
depending on the way other international legal actors interact
156. See United States v. Krauch et al. (“I.G. Farben case”), Judgment, in 8
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
[T.W.C.] 1081, 1132 (1948); United States v. Krupp et al., Judgment, in 9
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
[T.W.C.] 1327, 1447 (1948).
157. See, e.g., Case T-545/11, Stichting Greenpeace Nederland & Pesticide





ing implicitly that, because the Treaty on European Union intended for “an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as
openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen,” Greenpeace could
bring a claim for access to documents under EU Regulations (EC) 1049/2001
and 1367/2006, and Directive 91/313/EEC).
158. See New T.V. S.A.L. & Karma Mohamed Tashin Al Khayat, Case No.
STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Per-
sonal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 60 (Oct. 2, 2014) [hereinafter
New T.V. S.A.L., Decision on Interlocutory Appeal]; see also Al Jadeed [Co.]
S.A.L./New T.V. S.A.L. (N.T.V.) & Karma Mohamed Tashin Al Khayat, Case
No. STL-14-05/A/AP, Judgment (Appeals Panel, Mar. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Al
Jadeed [Co.], Appeals Panel Decision]; Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. & Ibrahim Mo-
hamed Ali Al Amin, Case No. STL-14-06/T/CJ, Judgment (July 15, 2016).
159. See New T.V. S.A.L., Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶¶ 42–44.
160. See id. ¶ 82.
161. See id. ¶ 83.
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with the entity.162 The most prominent of these bodies is the
ICRC.163 Both Switzerland, which concluded a headquarters
agreement with the ICRC and acknowledged its international
legal personality (at least as it concerns the Swiss legal order),164
and the ICTY recognize the ICRC’s personality. 165 In the Simić
case before the ICTY, the tribunal addressed the issue of
whether an employee of the ICRC could be compelled to testify
to facts acquired in the course of service to the organization.166
The tribunal concluded that the individuals did not create the
ICRC, rather, they vested the organization with important in-
ternational duties by treaty with widespread adherence.167 This
suggests that the Chamber might have considered the Geneva
Conventions as somehow constitutive of the ICRC’s interna-
tional legal personality.168 The Chamber later observed, how-
162. See, e.g., Agreement for the Establishment of a World Research Centre,
supra note 137.
163. See GEORGES WILLEMIN & ROGER HEACOCK, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OFWORLD SOCIETY 199–202 (1984).
164. Compare Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Statutes of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC art. 2 (Oct. 3, 2013)
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-statutes-080503.htm,
with Conclusion of a Headquarters Agreement Between the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Confederation, Mar. 19, 1993, re-
printed in 293 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 152 (1993) and Agreement to Determine
the Legal Status of the ICRC in Switzerland, supra note 25 and Protocol
Amending the Agreement on the Relations Between the International Com-
mission for the International Tracing Service and the International Committee
of the Red Cross, May 16, 2006, T.S. No. 20 (including participation of Belgium,
France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States, and the ICRC).
165. See Prosecutor v. Simić et al. (“Bosanski Šamac”), Case No. IT-95, Deci-
sion on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the
Testimony of a Witness (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 27,
1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/simic/tdec/en/90727EV59549.htm.
166. Id.
167. See id.; see also Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 9, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention [II] for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 82.
168. See Prosecutor v. Simić et al. (“Bosanski Šamac”), Case No. IT-95.
2016] Legal Personality of Non-State Actors 247
ever, that “the ICRC possesses international personality be-
cause states have tacitly recognized it as an international per-
son,”169 which reaffirms the understanding that personality for
that entity is relative and subjective.
But, the ICRC is not alone. Other entities incorporated under
domestic law might also have international legal personality.
For example, the International Air Transport Association
(IATA)170 and theWorld Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)171 are con-
sidered to have some degree of international personality compa-
rable to international organizations based on their functions.
The IATA is an association of various global airlines.172 WADA
is a foundation responsible for the World Anti-Doping Code,
which harmonizes anti-doping standards across sports.173 The
169. See PORTMANN, supra note 1, at 112 n.130 (citing Christian Dominicé,
La Personnalité Juridique Internationale du CICR, in ÉTUDES ETESSAIS SUR LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE
EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN PICTET 663, 672 (C. Swinarski ed., 1984)); CRAWFORD,
supra note 24, at 43–44.
170. See Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n [IATA], IATA’s Corporate Governance Struc-
ture, IATA.ORG, http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/corporate-structure.aspx
(last visited Feb. 19, 2017); Accord du 20 décembre 1976 entre le Conseil fédé-
ral suisse et l’Association du Transport aérien international (IATA) pour régler
le statut fiscal des services et du personnel de cette organisation en Suisse,
Dec. 20, 1976,
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/i1/0.192.122.748.fr.pdf (French); Agreement Be-
tween the Kingdom of Spain and the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) on the Status of the IATA in Spain pmbl. ¶ 4, May 5, 2009, 2643
U.N.T.S. 91 (“Bearing in mind: . . . . That the Kingdom of Spain recognises and
stresses the importance of IATA as an international organisation that pro-
motes air transport.”); Jenni et al. v. Conseil d’État of the Canton of Geneva
(Switz.), reprinted in 75 INT’LL. REP. 99 (“It was therefore without being guilty
of an arbitrary decision that the Council of State considered that IATA was a
public international organization within the meaning of Article 7 [of the Gen-
eral Law on Public Taxes of 9 November 1887].”).
171. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY [WADA], CONSTITUTIVE INSTRUMENT
OF FOUNDATION OF THE AGENCE MONDIALE ANTIDOPAGE/WORLD ANTI-DOPING
AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/Docu-
ments/About_WADA/Statutes/WADA_Statutes_2009_EN.pdf; Accord du 5
mars 2001 entre le Conseil fédéral suisse et l’Agence mondiale antidopage pour
régler le statut fiscal de l’Agence et de son personnel en Suisse, Mar. 5, 2001,
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c0_192_120_240.html (French); Study Prepared
for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, supra note 155.
172. See Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n [IATA], About Us, IATA,
http://www.iata.org/about/pages/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
173. See World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA], Who We Are, WADA,
https://www.wada-ama.org/en/who-we-are (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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International Olympic Committee also enjoys special status in
that it operates universally, has drafted the leading standards
for global sports organizations, and has a role in both the WADA
and the Court of Arbitration for Sport174—although whether it
enjoys truly international rights and duties is still unclear.
Other private entities are potential candidates to begin receiv-
ing treatment as international legal persons in the near future.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) and the Basel Institute on Governance’s International
Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) discharge quasi-governmental
roles independently from governments and have an interna-
tional impact, which may eventually transition them into inter-
national legal persons based on their roles.175 More peculiar ex-
amples might include the International Organization for Stand-
ardization (ISO), which is a private organization founded by in-
dividuals.176 It is largely considered a successor organization to
the International Standards Association and the United Nations
174. See David J. Ettinger, The Legal Status of the International Olympic
Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 97, 104 (1992) (mentioning that the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee has international personality); see also Nairobi
Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol, Sept. 26, 1981, 1863 U.N.T.S.
367.
175. For more information on ICANN, see Amended and Restated Articles of
Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
ICANN (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/arti-
cles-en; INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, DRAFT
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE 12, 30
(2009), http://www.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/draft-iic-implementation-26feb09-
en.pdf; Educational Material to Assist ICANN in Deciding What Status the
Corporation Should Aim for as a Private International Entity in Its Host Coun-
try, ICANN, paras. 5, 49–58, http://www.icann.org/en/psc/corell-24aug06.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (citing the Global Fund Headquarters Agreement
as a possible precedent for ICANN’s own review of its legal status). No final
version of the Draft Implementation Plan was available as of the date of this
publication. But, for one structural account of why regulation by a single entity
is not appropriate for the internet, see generally Thomas Schultz, Carving up
the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the Private/Public International
Law Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 799 (2008). For the Basel Institute’s ICAR,
see generally ICAR Mandated to Assist Ukraine in Recovering Yanukovych As-
sets, BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.baselgovern-
ance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/documents/press_release_2014-08-
11.pdf (reporting on the agreement between ICAR and Ukraine to help the
state recover assets stolen by the former Ukraine President Yanukovych).
176. See Int’l Org. for Standardization, About ISO, ISO,
https://www.iso.org/about-us.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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Standards Coordinating Committee177 and has a prominent role
in establishing standards that can be adopted in legally binding
instruments, such as the WTO Agreements.178 ISO membership
includes various scientific associations, many of which are gov-
ernment bodies.179 At some point, its significance may justify
special treatment as an international legal person, at least for
certain purposes, such as immunities for the organization or the
ability to enter into treaties. But, for now, these actions are not
possible. Similarly, the European Broadcasting Union, which
produces the Euronews channel and the Eurovision song con-
test,180 might be another entity with personality poised for tran-
sition. On the one hand, it is clearly an association incorporated
under Swiss law181 that does not assert state immunity or simi-
lar treatment,182 yet, on the other hand, it receives considerable
financial support from the European Union183 and benefits from
unusual privileges due to its important role in European cooper-
ation and integration.184
177. See INT’LORG. FOR STANDARDIZATIONCENTRAL SECRETARIAT, FRIENDSHIP
AMONG EQUALS: RECOLLECTIONS FROM ISO’S FIRST FIFTYYEARS 15–18 (1997).
178. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade annex 1, ¶ 2, Apr. 15,
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
179. See ISO Members, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_mem-
bers.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
180. See About Us, EUR. BROADCASTING UNION, https://www.ebu.ch/about
(last visited Feb. 20, 2017); The Story, EUROVISION SONG CONTEST,
http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/the-story (last visited Mar. 22, 2017);
About Euronews, EURONEWS, http://www.euronews.com/about (last visited
Mar. 22, 2017).
181. EUR. BROADCASTING UNION, STATUTES OF THE EUROPEAN BROADCASTING
UNION art. 1.1 (Dec. 2015),
http://www3.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/About/Governance/Stat-
utes%202013_EN.pdf.
182. See Case C-98/92 P, Eur. Broadcasting Union v. La Cinq SA, Order,
E.C.R. (1992), reprinted in 1992 O.J. C (310) 3 (ruling that a decision was un-
necessary).
183. See Written Question No. 1664/91 by Mr. Georgios Romeos (S) to the
Commission of the European Communities, 1992 O.J. (C 66) 26, 27 (discussing
official financial support from the EU to Euronews).
184. See Case C-470/02 P, Union européenne de radio-télévision (UER) v.
Comm’n of the Eur. Comms., E.C.R., reprinted in 2003 O.J. (C 55), 13–14 (doc-
umenting, for example, the role of the European Union in the management and
activities of the European Broadcasting Union with respect to the Eurovision
song contest); European Commission Press Release IP/00/472, Commission Ap-
proves the EBU-Eurovision System (May 12, 2000) (reporting that the Euro-
pean Commission exempted the European Broadcasting Union from normal
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Other entities participate, sometimes very intimately, with
other international persons; however, it is difficult to consider
them international persons, despite functional analysis suggest-
ing otherwise. For example, the Carnegie Foundation is consid-
ered to be a “private foundation” in private diplomatic corre-
spondence.185Nonetheless, it entered into an agreement with the
United Nations for the ICJ to use the premises of the Peace Pal-
ace in The Hague, and this agreement was registered with the
U.N. Secretary-General and published in the U.N. Treaty Se-
ries.186 Accordingly, notwithstanding the ICJ’s holding in Anglo-
Iranian Oil, occasionally, agreements are made between inter-
national persons and private corporations and are deposited (ei-
ther mistakenly or due to the unavailability of a more appropri-
ate vehicle) with the U.N. Secretary-General as if they were
treaties.187 The U.N.-Carnegie Foundation agreement notes,
however, that it is “expressly understood that the question of the
establishment of the [ICJ] at the Peace Palace exclusively con-
cerns the [United Nations] and the Carnegie Foundation, and is
consequently outside the jurisdiction of any other organization.
. . .”188 The reasons behind the unexpected use of the expression
“jurisdiction” along with the term “organization” is not entirely
clear. Normally, “jurisdiction” is reserved for the lawful author-
ity of states, not organizations. Perhaps, this phrase is intended
to exclude the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Peace Palace Li-
brary, and Hague Academy of International Law from exercising
their “jurisdiction” by interfering with the establishment of the
ICJ. In any event, it appears that this agreement is not a mere
rental contract under Dutch law. If that is the case, then the
foundation has some power to conclude agreements outside of
antitrust law regarding Eurovision because, inter alia, “the Eurovision System
facilitates cross-border broadcasting and contributes to the development of a
single European broadcasting market.”).
185. See U.S. Dep’t of State, First Forum of the UN Alliance of Civilizations,
Cable No. 08MADRID52_a, WIKILEAKS paras. 1, 4 (Jan. 18, 2008), https://wik-
ileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MADRID52_a.html# [hereinafter Cable No.
08MADRID52_a] (reporting on the “First Forum of the Alliance of Civiliza-
tions,” which was attended by the Carnegie Foundation as a “private founda-
tion”).
186. See G.A. Res. 84 (I), annex A (Dec. 11, 1946).
187. See, e.g., Project Agreement—Technical Specification and Market Study
of Potentially Important Jute Geotextile Products, adopted July 26, 1991, 1792
U.N.T.S. 452.
188. See G.A. Res. 84(I), supra note 186, annex A, art. XV.
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normal domestic law agreements and, perhaps on that basis, is
not an ordinary Dutch Stichting (foundation). Notwithstanding
this unusual “international” agreement and the public function
that the foundation serves, it seems uncomfortable to view the
foundation as an international person, even though the parallels
with the ICRC are difficult to avoid.
In addition, some authorities assert that transnational corpo-
rations and NGOs already enjoy a degree of international per-
sonality beyond the isolated and peculiar examples cited
above.189 Of course, corporations are increasingly being seen as
potentially responsible for international crimes,190 and they are
leaders in setting international standards,191 similar in some
ways to the work of the ISO. Additionally, international litiga-
tion between states and international corporations is becoming
commonplace,192 and some treaties,193 and possibly even general
189. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; Protocol
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1932, 213 U.N.T.S. 262; North American Free Trade
Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289; MARIOPROST,
THECONCEPT OFUNITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2012); PORTMANN, su-
pra note 1, at 42–79; Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 229 (2015) (arguing that private corporations are increasingly able to cre-
ate new rules of international law); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005); see
also José Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2011); Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation
in International Law and the Pretence of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977
(2011).
190. See generally Joanna Kyriakakis, Developments in International Crimi-
nal Law and the Case of Business Involvement in International Crimes, 94 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 981 (2012).
191. See Vaughan Lowe, Corporations as International Law Actors and Law-
Makers, 14 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 23, 23–26 (2004).
192. See, e.g., Award on the Merits in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company,
supra note 9; Christoph Schreuer, Access to ICSID Dispute Settlement for Lo-
cally Incorporated Companies, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A
HUMAN FACE 497 (Friedl Weiss, Erik Denters, & Paul de Waart eds., 1998);
T.W. Wälde, Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty: From
Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation, 12 ARB. INT’L 429, 429–67 (1996).
193. See G.A. Res. 58/4, annex, U.N. Convention Against Corruption art. 23
(Oct. 31, 2003); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption art. 18, Jan. 27, 1999,
E.T.S. No. 173; Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions arts. 2–3, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 105-43; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption art. VIII,
Mar. 29,1996, S. TREATY DOC. 105-39; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
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international law, directly impose rights and duties on corpora-
tions.194 Even for those NGOs that do not enjoy these kinds of
special statuses, many NGOs have been admitted to the U.N.
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as observers.195None of
these activities, however, constitute participation in the interna-
tional sphere in the classic sense. Some authorities even suggest
that NGOs and corporations should now have a role in contrib-
uting to customary international law196 and otherwise forming
new international norms.197 These developments have led some
to conclude that corporations now enjoy limited international le-
gal personality linked to their functions,198 especially in the in-
vestment dispute context, where the personality is relative and
limited to the parties to the dispute, not erga omnes.
arts. 137(1)–(3), 187–88, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994); International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage arts. I(3), III–VII, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3. See
generally Award on the Merits in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company, supra
note 9.
194. SeeMalcolm Langford, Cosmopolitan Competition: The Case of Interna-
tional Investment, in COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE AND ITSDISCONTENTS 179 (Cecilia
M. Bailliet & Katja Franko Aas eds., 2011); Menno T. Kamminga, Holding
Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: A Chal-
lenge for the European Community, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 556–61
(Philip Alston et al. eds., 1999).
195. See U.N. Charter art. 71 (“The Economic and Social Council may make
suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations
which are concerned with matters within its competence.”); Economic and So-
cial Council Res. 1996/31 (July 25, 1996).
196. See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg., 2002 I.C.J. at 155 (dissenting opinion by
Van den Wyngaert, J.) (citing “the opinion of civil society”); Roberts & Siva-
kumaran, supra note 109; Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Custom-
ary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 108
(1995) (examining the practice of states plus “international organizations,
transnational corporations and other nongovernmental groups.”). Also, note
that the original proposal to define custom in the statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, which stated that “practice between nations [is]
accepted by them [the nations] as law,” was rejected, suggesting that the prac-
tice might not be limited to states only.
197. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (July
14, 2006), 14 ICSID Rep. 374; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005).
198. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 250 (“[T]he question of the international
personality of transnational corporations remains an open one.”); CLAPHAM,
supra note 27, at 515–16; BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 525; David Kinley &
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This possible development is not without precedent. Histori-
cally, many colonial companies under the East India Company
model entered into agreements with indigenous peoples and Eu-
ropean states that were not formal treaties under contemporary
international law but were substantively comparable and may
have been regarded at the time as true treaties under interna-
tional law.199 While not dispositive,200 many of these agreements
were even titled “treaty.”201 One reason we can infer that the
parties regarded them as treaties under international law is that
some of the topics covered in such agreements involved matters
Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsi-
bilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 944–46
(2004); Alvarez, supra note 189, at 2.
199. For further information, see infra notes 201–04.
200. See VCLT, supra note 19, art. 2(1)(a) (“Treaty means . . . [the following
definition] . . . whatever its particular designation.”).
201. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Danish West India Company and Bran-
denburg, Dec. 4, 1685, 17 Consol. T.S. 387; Asiento Between Spain and the
Portuguese Guinea Company, July 12, 1696, 21 Consol. T.S. 151; Agreement
Between the Netherlands West Indies Company and Hanau, July 24, 1669, 11
Consol.T.S. 173; Asiento for the Introduction of Negro Slaves into Spanish
America Between the French Guinea Company and Spain, Aug. 27, 1701, 23
Consol. T.S. 489; Asiento Between Spain and the East India Company (Great
Britain), Mar. 26, 1713, 27 Consol. T.S. 425; Convention Between the British
East India Company and the Swedish East India Company, Oct. 6, 1740, 36
Consol. T.S. 95; Treaty Between the East India Companies of Great Britain
and the Netherlands, Dec. 1, 1759, 41 Consol. T.S. 359; Treaty Between the
East India Company (Great Britain) and the Imam of Senna (Yemen), Jan. 15,
1802, 71 Consol. T.S. 335. In an odd twist, these agreements were often
adopted by the state of the corporation’s “nationalized” incorporation at a later
date and discharged as public law or treaty obligations and not mere contrac-
tual obligations. If they were not initially treaty obligations, then the adoption
would have had the effect of “treaty-izing” the obligations, a process heretofore
unknown in international law. Therefore, they must have been treaty obliga-
tions ab initio.
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normally covered by public law, such as raising a military,202 es-
tablishing a protectorate,203 and cessation of territory.204 In ad-
dition, in the nineteenth century, the unique entity of the Han-
seatic League operated on the international plane as a trade con-
federation with leadership vested in the cites of Hamburg,
Lubeck, and sometimes Bremen.205 Some of these agreements
also clearly dealt with matters of public law.206 These latter ex-
amples of state-corporation treaties of the type used by the East
India Company are of course removed from contemporary inter-
national law but not so distantly as we might think, as the latest
one was concluded as late as 1914.207 The strange situation in-
volving international colonial companies in international law,
while initially tempting to view in contemporary corporate
202. See, e.g., Agreement Between Denmark and Brandenburg Regarding the
Supply of Troops and the Composition of Differences at St. Thomas Between
the Danish and Brandenburg West India Companies, Apr. 21, 1692, 19 Consol.
T.S. 467.
203. See, e.g., Agreement Between Great Britain and the British North Bor-
neo Company for the Establishment of a Protectorate, May 12, 1888, 171 Con-
sol. T.S. 53.
204. See, e.g., Contract of Sale and Cession of the Island of St. Croix Between
France and the Danish West India Co., June 15, 1733, 34 Consol. T.S. 47.
205. See, e.g., Convention of Commerce Between Great Britain and the Han-
seatic Republics of Lubeck, Bremen and Hamburg, Sept. 29, 1825, 75 Consol.
T.S. 385; Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the
Hanseatic Republics (Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck) and the United States,
Dec. 20, 1827, 77 Consol. T.S. 477; Additional Act for the Navigation of the
Elbe Between Anhalt, Austria, Denmark, Hanover, the Hanse Towns of Ham-
burg and Lubeck, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Prussia and Saxony, Apr. 13, 1844,
96 Consol. T.S. 307-1; Convention Between Anhalt, Austria, Denmark, Hano-
ver, the Hanse Towns of Hamburg and Lubeck, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Prus-
sia and Saxony on the Publication of Uniform Police Ordinances for the Elbe,
Apr. 13, 1844, 96 Consol. T.S. 307-3; Additional Commercial Convention Be-
tween the Hanse Towns of Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck, and Sardinia, Sept.
20, 1860, 123 Consol. T.S. 49; Additional Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Nav-
igation Between the Hanseatic Cities of Bremen, Hanover and Lubeck, and
Turkey, Sept. 27, 1862, 126 Consol. T.S. 299.
206. See, e.g., Consular Convention Between the Hanseatic Republics (Bre-
men, Hamburg and Lubeck) and the United States, Apr. 30, 1852, 108 Consol.
T.S. 91; see also Convention Between France, Great Britain and the Hanse
Towns (Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck), for the Accession of the Latter to the
Slave Trade Conventions, June 9, 1837, 87 Consol. T.S. 19 (providing for ac-
cession to a treaty of general application to subjects of international law).
207. SeeAgreement Between the British South Africa Co. (Great Britain) and
Portugal Amending the Agreement of 28 August 1913 Relative to the Recruit-
ment of Native Labourers for Rhodesia, July 4, 1914, 220 Consol. T.S. 152.
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terms, is probably more accurately viewed as a hybrid state-cor-
porate, quasi-national entity.208 In any event, this historical
study may suggest that international legal personality, as the
exclusive quality we see today, may have been far more fluid and
liberal in the past.
E. Religious Organizations
Religious organizations also operate on the international plane
to some degree, and some of these bodies clearly have interna-
tional legal personality. While religious organizations do not ap-
pear to have a unique legal status in international law based on
their missions,209 they are capable of bearing international legal
personality and, at times, are accorded personality on a func-
tional basis.
The most obvious and well accepted example of a religious or-
ganization that bears international legal personality is the Holy
208. See Koen Stapelbroek, Chartered Companies, and Merchantile Associa-
tions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339
(Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012).
209. See generally IOANACISMAS, RELIGIOUSACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2014).
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See.210 The Holy See is not a state,211 although it is sometimes
referred to as a state212 or otherwise treated as if it were a state,
apparently without much consideration of its unusual nature.
For example, the Holy See’s practice is usually considered along-
side the practice of states for the formation of customary inter-
national law.213 It is often argued that the distinction between
the Holy See and other actors in this article, similar to that of
states, is rooted in the difference between original and derivative
personality. Like states, the Holy See claims it has “original,
210. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Holy See and Prussia, July 16, 1821,
72 Consol. T.S. 81; Accord Between France and the Holy See, Fr.-Holy See,
Apr. 16, 1832, 82 Consol. T.S. 381; Agreement Between Belgium and the Holy
See Relative to Navigation etc., Belg.-Holy See, Apr. 7, 1840, 90 Consol. T.S.
83; Agreement Between the Holy See and Modena Respecting Ecclesiastical
Property, June 23, 1857, 117 Consol. T.S. 75; Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, re-
printed in D. SCHINDLER AND J. TOMAN, THELAWS OFARMEDCONFLICTS 280–81
(Martinus Nihjoff ed., 1988) (no longer in force); Additional Postal Convention
Between France and the Holy See, Fr.-Holy See, July 11, 1865, 130 Consol.
T.S. 274; Additional Protocol to the Convention of 4 August 1898 Between Co-
lombia and the Holy See, Colom.-Holy See, July 3, 1907, 204 Consol. T.S. 299;
Treaty Between the Holy See and Italy (“Lateran Accords”), Holy See-It., Feb.
11, 1929, http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/dam/vaticanstate/docu-
menti/leggi-e-decreti/Normative-Penali-e-Amministrative/LateranTreaty.pdf;
Protocol on Road Signs and Signals, Sept. 19, 1949, 514 U.N.T.S. 254; Agree-
ment Between the Holy See and the Argentine Republic, Arg.-Holy See, Oct.
10, 1966, 601 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement Concerning Mutual Relations, Holy
See-Sp., July 28, 1976, 1030 U.N.T.S. 357; Agreement Concerning Economic
Matters, Holy See-Sp., Jan. 3, 1979, 1154 U.N.T.S. 39; Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Prohi-
bition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines
and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Holy See v. Star-
bright Sales Enterprises Inc. (S.C., Dec. 1, 1994) (Phil.), reprinted in 102 INT’L
L. REP. 163, 169.
211. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 43–44. But see JORRI DUURSMA,
FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONALRELATIONS OFMICRO-STATES 374–419
(James Crawford et al. eds., 1996).
212. See, e.g., Arms Trade Treaty, First Conference of States Parties, Draft
Final Rep., ¶ 15, ATT Doc. No. ATT/CSP1/2015 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“The following
twelve (12) States also attended the Conference as observers: Algeria, Bot-
swana, China, Fiji, the Holy See, Jordan, Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Viet Nam and Yemen.” (emphasis added)).
213. See, e.g., Alain Pellet (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on Reservations
to Treaties, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/491 (Apr. 30, 1998) (considering the practice
of the Holy See as state practice for purposes of the formation of customary
international law).
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nonderived legal personality.”214 In an ICJ advisory opinion re-
quested by the WHO on the legality of the use of nuclear weap-
ons in armed conflict under international law, the court held
that the crucial factor in determining original and derivative
personality focuses on which entity can create another and “in-
vest” it with powers.215 The difficulty is that some authorities
implicitly assert that only states are original persons.216 In addi-
tion, the very notion of originality is relative; international or-
ganizations have capacity to create other international organi-
zations and invest them with powers,217 so, in that relative
sense, an international organization could be said to be the orig-
inal person and the new organization would therefore be derived
from it. Nevertheless, the personality of the Holy See does not
depend on an act of creation by another international legal per-
son.
The Holy See, however, is not entirely unique. Other religious
entities exist with partial and functional, international person-
ality. The most well-known of these strange cases is probably the
Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM), otherwise known as
the “Knights of Malta.”218 But, the phenomenon of sovereign mil-
itary orders historically included entities other than the
SMOM.219 Reaching the same conclusion as this article, other
214. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, List of Issues in Relation to the
Second Periodic Report of the Holy See, Addendum: Replies of the Holy See to
the List of Issues, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/VAT/Q/2/Add.1 (Jan. 9, 2014).
215. See Legality of the Use by a State of NuclearWeapons in Armed Conflict,
1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Na-
tions, 1949 I.C.J. at 178–79.
216. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 247–48, 261 (“States are the original and
major subjects of international law.”).
217. See Agreement for the Establishment of the Joint Vienna Institute, su-
pra note 27 (evidencing an international organization created purely by other
international organizations).
218. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Sovereign Order of Malta and Poland,
Malta-Pol., Feb. 2, 1775, 45 Consol. T.S. 465; Convention Between Bavaria and
the Sovereign Order of Malta, Jan. 28, 1806, 58 Consol. T.S. 381; Cass., Nanni
v. Pace & the Sovereign Order of Malta, 13 marzo 1935 (It.), reprinted in 8
ANN. DIGEST 2 (1935–1937); CASSESE, supra note 50, at 132.
219. See, e.g., Convention Between the Teutonic Order and the States of the
Former Confederation of the Rhine, Aug. 15, 1813, 62 Consol. T.S. 343; Con-
vention Between the Teutonic Order and Wurtemberg, Aug. 15, 1813, 62 Con-
sol. T.S. 351; see also Treaty Between Brandenburg and the Equestrian Order
of Prussia, Nov. 12, 1655, 4 Consol. T.S. 21; Karol Karski, The International
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authorities have described the personality of the SMOM as
“functional.”220 In addition to the SMOM, we also have the curi-
ous Paréage of Andorra, which was adopted between the Count
of Foix and the Bishop of Urgell in 1278 and established joint
sovereignty over Andorra until 1993, when the entity adopted
its modern constitution and became a modern state.221 At that
time, the contemporary heirs to the Paréage were the President
of France and Bishop of Urgell, who were functioning as “Co-
Princes.” The arrangement was sometimes termed a “condomin-
ium,” although it is unclear whether this term is correct when
the governance is not by two states sharing sovereignty but ra-
ther two individuals acting as co-Heads of State.222 In any event,
apparently, as late as 1993, the international community ac-
cepted the possibility of a bishop having the functional capacity
to personally dispose of the sovereignty of a state.
The Dalai Lama provides another example of a religious actor
having international personality. This religious leader enjoys
some aspects of international respect, although his personality
is difficult to separate from the personality of Tibet and/or the
Tibetan Government in Exile223 and perhaps overlaps with a
Legal Status of the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusa-
lem of Rhodes and of Malta, 14 INT’LCOMM. L. REV. 19, 31 (2012) (“After losing
its state in 1525, the Teutonic Order lost its attribute of an independent subject
of international law.”); J. H. W. VERZIJL, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 32–37 (M. Bos ed., 6th ed. 1968) (discussing the possible interna-
tional legal personality of the Jesuits).
220. See Arthur C. Breycha-Vautier, Order of St. John in International Law:
A Forerunner of the Red Cross, 48 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 561 (1954) (reporting on
the conclusions of a papal tribunal that “[t]he status of [the] sovereign Order .
. . [i]s functional, that is to say, intended to assure the fulfilment of the scope
of activities of the Order and its development throughout the world”); Cass.,
Sovereign Order of Malta v. Brunelli, Tacali & Others, 17 dicembre 1931 (It.),
reprinted in 6 INT’LL. REP. 46 (stating that the SMOM has sovereign immunity
“corresponding to the needs of its autonomy”).
221. See Michael Emerson, Andorra and the European Union 38–39 (Cent.
for Eur. Policy Studies, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1333147; see also Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and
Co-operation, June 3, 1993, 1872 U.N.T.S. 181 (recognizing Andorra as a sov-
ereign state); Drozd & Janousek v. France & Spain, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A)
¶ 88 (1992) (recognizing Andorra as a “European country” rather than a “state”
up until 1993).
222. There are arguments that the French President used his Princely office
for the benefit of France, a state foreign to Andorra.
223. See, e.g., Agreement Between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending
the Trade Regulations of 5 December 1893, Apr. 20, 1908, 206 Consol. T.S. 412;
2016] Legal Personality of Non-State Actors 259
government in exile or an NLM movement. It often remains
blurred whether the engagement with the person or office is
truly on the political international plane or on a personal, pro-
fessional, or spiritual level.224 Certainly, the Dalai Lama has a
significant international influence on political outcomes, and
considering our definition of personality as having the capacity
for international agreement, legation, and claim, this actor does
exhibit characteristics of functional personality.225
Convention Between Great Britain and Tibet, Sept. 7, 1904, 196 Consol. T.S.
312; Exchange of Notes Regarding the India-Tibet Frontier, Mar. 25, 1914, 219
Consol. T.S. 339; Trade Regulations Between Great Britain and Tibet, July 3,
1914, 220 Consol. T.S. 148. There are no agreements registered, however, with
the U.N. Secretary-General that list Tibet or the Dalai Lama as a party.
224. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Possible Dalai Lama Visit to Italy and Vat-
ican, Cable No. 1973ROME5798_b, WIKILEAKS paras. 1–3 (June 22, 1973),
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973ROME05798_b.html (reporting on the
Dalai Lama’s contacts with the Italian government and noting that if the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) demanded an explanation, the government of
Italy would explain that the visit was “religious and cultural”); U.S. Dep’t of
State, PRC Reaction to Dalai Lama, Cable No. 1973COPENHAGEN2125_b,
WIKILEAKS (Sept. 5, 1973), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/1973COPENH02125_b.html (reporting on PRC pressure on the Danish
Embassy to refuse a visa to the Dalai Lama and the Danish reply that the visit
was purely as a “religious leader” and not as a “political figure”); U.S. Dep’t of
State,Dalai Lama Visit to Austria, Cable No. 1973VIENNA7734_b, WIKILEAKS
para 2. (Sept. 19, 1973), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/1973VIENNA07734_b.html (noting that Austria agreed to issue a visa on
condition of a “commitment from Dalai Lama to refrain from all political activ-
ity.”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Minister Comments on Possible Dalai Lama
Visit, Cable No. 06ULAANBAATAR634_a, WIKILEAKS para. 3 (Aug. 18, 2006),
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06ULAANBAATAR634_a.html (“[T]he U.S.
likely would reiterate publicly our [U.S.] belief that the Dalai Lama is an in-
ternational man of peace who should be allowed freedom to travel.”).
225. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1353(XIV) (Oct. 21, 1959) (“Gravely concerned at re-
ports, including the official statements of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the
effect that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet
have been forcibly denied them. . . .” (emphasis added)); U.S. Dep’t of State,
Dalai Lama Visit to Italy, Cable No. 1973ROME9464_b, WIKILEAKS (Sept. 11,
1973), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973ROME09464_b.html (reporting
on the Dalai Lama’s representative contacts with the Italian Foreign Ministry
and other multiple European governments); U.S. Dep’t of State, The Dalai
Lama’s Representative in New Delhi, Cable No. 1975NEWDE13760_b,
WIKILEAKS (Oct. 15, 1975), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/1975NEWDE13760_b.html (discussing a proposed meeting between Em-
bassy Political Section officials and the Dalai Lama’s representative); U.S.
Dep’t of State, July 3 MFA Press Briefing: Yang DPRK Visit, Papal Letter, Ti-
betan Envoy, Climate Change, Food Safety, Visits, More, Cable No.
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The Ismaili Imamat226 is another religious actor with unclear
personality. More obscure than the Dalai Lama or Pope, and
07BEIJING4457_a, WIKILEAKS (July 3, 2007), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/07BEIJING4457_a.html (reporting on travels of the Dalai Lama’s “Special
Envoy”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Dalai Lama’s Representative Predicts Continued
Unrest in Tibet, Cable No. 08NEWDELHI808_a, WIKILEAKS para. 1 (Mar. 18,
2008), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NEWDELHI808_a.html (reporting
on a meeting between a U.S. Ambassador and the Dalai Lama); U.S. Dep’t of
State, Tibet: Scholars Praise Decision to Restart Contact with Dalai Lama, but
Expectations are Low, Cable No. 08BEIJING1697_a, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 30,
2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BEIJING1697_a.html (discussing
the PRC decision to reopen talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives); U.S.
Dep’t of State, Tibet: MFA Says Talks with Dalai Lama Representatives “Mark
a New Beginning,” Cable No. 08BEIJING1715_a, WIKILEAKS para. 3 (May 5,
2008), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BEIJING1715_a.html (discussing
the meeting of PRC leadership representatives with private representatives of
the Dalai Lama); U.S. Dep’t of State, July 8 MFA Press Briefing: Six-Party
Talks, Dalai Lama Talks, Human Rights, Olympics, Xinjiang Mosque, Aid to
DPRK, Sudan, Cable No. 08BEIJING2666_a, WIKILEAKS para. 3 (July 8,
2008), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BEIJING2666_a.html (reporting on
“contact” between “competent parties” in the Chinese Government and the rep-
resentatives of the Dalai Lama); U.S. Dep’t of State, Dalai Lama Seeks U.S.
Engagement with China on Climate Change in Tibet, Says Political Agenda
Can Wait, Cable No. 09NEWDELHI1667_a, WIKILEAKS para. 7 (Aug. 10,
2009), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NEWDELHI1667_a.html (report-
ing on a meeting between a U.S. Ambassador and the Dalai Lama); U.S. Dep’t
of State, Tibet Party Official Derides Dalai Lama, Yet Welcomes Him “Home,”
Cable No. 09CHENGDU248_a, WIKILEAKS paras. 4, 10 (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09CHENGDU248_a.html (discussing that
“[f]rom 2002-2008, there were nine rounds of talks held with the personal rep-
resentatives of the Dalai Lama” and reporting the Dalai Lama’s speech to the
European Parliament, where he advocated for the creation of a self-governing
democratic Tibet “in association with the People’s Republic of China”).
226. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Republic of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Ismaili Imamat for the Establishment
of the University of Central Asia, Aug. 28–31, 2000, 2159 U.N.T.S. 161 [here-
inafter Treaty for the Establishment of the UCA]. The text and language of the
agreement is clearly intended to be a treaty, although it is not entirely clear
whether the Imamat was truly considered a treaty partner or if the agreement
was a treaty only because there was more than one state in agreement. See
also U.S. Dep’t of State, Tajikstan: Aga Khan Serena Hotel Probably Down the
Tubes – “Who Wants On ‘Old-Shoe Hotel?’,” Cable No. 06DUSHANBE402_a,
WIKILEAKS para. 10 (Mar. 1, 2006), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/06DUSHANBE402_a.html [hereinafter Cable No. 06DUSHANBE402_a]
(noting that the Aga Khan is “revered . . . as a sovereign” in the Gorno Badakh-
shan Autonomous Oblast in Tajikistan, is accorded “almost quasi-governmen-
tal status [in Tajikistan] because it essentially provides the lion’s share of all
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therefore requiring more explanation, the Ismaili Imamat is the
religious leadership of the global Ismaili community, which is
led by the Aga Khan and has its own internal governance.227
While the Aga Khan’s position has been compared to the Roman
Catholic Pope228 due to his unusual mixture of religious and tem-
poral authority,229 his precise position within the Ismaili reli-
gious community defies parallels to Western notions of religious
leaders.230 The lineage of the hereditary imams is claimed to
development and even basic social support to the Pamiri people of Badakh-
shan,” and that “[t]he current conventional political wisdom is that no one
dares challenge the political power of the ‘Khan of Tajikistan,’ [the Aga
Khan]”). But see His Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan v. Nagib Tajdin et al.,
[2011] F.C. 14, ¶¶ 25, 58–59 (Can. F.C.) (observing similarly that the Aga Kahn
submitted himself to a discovery interview apparently without any considera-
tions of immunity); Cable No. 08MADRID52_a, supra note 185, paras. 1, 4 (re-
porting on the “First Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations,” which was at-
tended by the U.N. Sectary-General and many heads of state, including a rep-
resentative of the Aga Khan, and alternatively describing the Aga Khan as a
“private foundation” akin to the Carnegie Foundation); supra Part I.D (discuss-
ing the Carnegie Foundation).
227. See Nagib Tajdin et al., [2011] F.C. ¶¶ 53–54 (making reference to the
1986 and 1998 “Constitutions” of the Imamat); U.S. Dep’t of State, The Agha
Khan Tries to Solve Electoral Impasse, Cable No. 09KABUL3383_a, WIKILEAKS
para. 2 (Oct. 21, 2009), http://wikileaks.org/plusd/ca-
bles/09KABUL3383_a.html [hereinafter Cable No. 09KABUL3383_a] (“The
Agha Khan became Imam of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims in 1957. He is
the 49th hereditary Imam of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims and a direct de-
scendant of the Prophet Muhammad though his cousin and son-in-law Ali, the
first Imam, and his wife Fatima, the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter. The Is-
mailis live in 25 countries, mainly in West and Central Asia, Africa and the
Middle East, and North American and Western Europe.”); U.S. Dep’t of State,
Rumored Exodus of Aga Khan Followers from Mozambique, Cable No. 1974-
LOUREN-00275_b, WIKILEAKS para. 1 (Apr. 25, 1974), https://www.wik-
ileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LOUREN00275_b.html (“We have heard a rumor
circulating around Lourenco Marques’ Indian community that Aga Khan fol-
lowers (Ismaili) have been instructed by Aga Khan to leave Mozambique and
establish themselves in another country with more promising economic climate
– e.g. either metropolitan Portugal or Canada.”).
228. See Thomas Thompson, Three Faces of the Fourth Aga, 63 LIFE, no. 2,
1967, at 43 (comparing the Aga Khan to the Catholic Pope)
229. See Haji Bibi v. H. H. Sir Sultan Mahomad Shah Aga Khan, 2 Ind. Cas.
874, para. 130 (1908) (India) (finding that the religious, monetary offerings
made to the Aga Khan by his followers are his personal property); Nagib Taj-
din et al., [2011] F.C. ¶¶ 62–63 (observing that the defendant refused to con-
duct the discovery interview of the Aga Khan).
230. See, e.g., Nagib Tajdin et al., [2011] F.C. ¶ 44 (observing that the de-
fendants had great difficulty explaining the relationship of the Aga Khan and
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begin with the Prophet Mohammed,231 with the four most recent
imams (including the current one) holding the title “Aga
Khan.”232 The Aga Khan is a British citizen but is also granted
the privilege of using a French diplomatic passport.233 Even to-
day, he is sometimes considered a “royal” or even “sovereign”
person without territorial sovereignty.234
Analyzing the international rights of treaty, legation, and
claim, the general international legal personality of the Imamat
remains unclear, though there may be some rudimentary, func-
tional rights. The Imamat, however, is party to at least one
treaty registered with the U.N. Secretary-General.235 In 2000,
the states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan agreed
with the Ismaili Imamat to create the University of Central Asia
(UCA).236 Of course, the founding of a university by treaty is not
entirely unusual,237 even a treaty that includes a noninterna-
tional legal person as a party.238 This is reminiscent of BIS and
his followers outside of the Ismaili frame of reference); Haji Bibi, 2 Ind. Cas.
para. 130.
231. See Nagib Tajdin et al., [2011] F.C.; Nagib Tajdin et al. v. His Highness
Prince Karim Aga Khan, 2012 F.C.A 12, ¶¶ 2–4 (Can.); Haji Bibi, 2 Ind. Cas.
paras. 41–42; Cable No. 09KABUL3383_a, supra note 227, para. 2; AGHAKHAN
DEV. NETWORK, His Highness the Aga Khan,
http://www.akdn.org/about_agakhan.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
232. See Cable No. 09KABUL3383_a, supra note 227; see alsoG. Pascal Zach-
ary, The Aga Khan, a Jet-Setter Who Mixes Business and Islam, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/business/worldbusi-
ness/09iht-khan.4.6569846.html.
233. See Nagib Tajdin et al., [2011] F.C.; Nagib Tajdin, 2012 F.C.A ¶¶ 3, 23.
234. See Cable No. 08MADRID52_a, supra note 185, paras. 1, 4; Cable No.
06DUSHANBE402_a, supra note 226, para. 10. Curiously, Forbes magazine
lists him as the only nonterritorial sovereign in its annual list of the ten richest
royals. See Tatiana Serafin, The World’s Richest Royals, FORBES (July 7, 2010),
https://www.forbes.com/2010/07/07/richest-royals-wealth-monarch-wedding-
divorce-billionaire.html. Though imprecise, the Ismaili community within In-
dia and Africa enjoyed a certain degree of judicial independence. See Mumtaz
Ali Tajddin, Ismaili Constitution, ENCYCLOPEDIA ISMAILISM, http://isma-
ili.net/heritage/node/10433 (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
235. See Treaty for the Establishment of the UCA, supra note 226. Note that
the Aga Khan represented the Imamat as an Imam.
236. See id.
237. See, e.g., Convention Setting up a European University Institute, Apr.
19, 1972 (amended 1992), http://www.eui.eu/Documents/AboutEUI/Conven-
tion/ConsolidatedConventionRevising.pdf.
238. For example, the Riga Graduate School of Law was created in 1998 as a
limited liability nonprofit corporation under Latvian law by an international
agreement between Sweden, Latvia, and the Soros Foundation, which also
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GAVI. In addition, the establishment of a university with per-
sonality—apparently on the international plane—has precedent
in the cases of the University for Peace and the European Uni-
versity Institute, both of which were created by treaty and enjoy
certain immunities on the international plane.239 Furthermore,
it is possible for international legal persons to enter into an
agreement registered with the U.N. Secretary-General, yet not
be considered a treaty.240 Nonetheless, in the case of the UCA,
the instrument was expressly considered a treaty and registered
as such,241 although designation of an instrument as a “treaty”
is only informative of its nature and is not by itself determina-
tive.242 The treaty did, however, include language that charac-
terizes it as a treaty.243 It identified all parties as the “Founders”
and clearly identified the states parties as “Founding States.”244
gifted the school its building. Over time, the shares in the school were trans-
ferred from the states to the University of Latvia, though the Soros Foundation
retained its ownership interest. See Riga Graduate Sch. of Law, History,
RGSL.EDU, http://www.rgsl.edu.lv/en/inside-rgsl/about/history/ (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017).
239. See Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the University for
Peace, supra note 132, arts. 5 (“The Headquarters seat shall be inviolable and
shall be under the control and authority of the University.”), 6 (“The University
premises, its assets, income and other property shall enjoy the same terms and
protection as United Nations premises, assets and income in Costa Rica.”);
Convention Setting up a European University Institute, supra note 237; Treaty
for the Establishment of the UCA, supra note 226, art 2.
240. See, e.g., Joint Financing Agreement, June 7, 1971, 891 U.N.T.S. 123.
241. See Treaty for the Establishment of the UCA, supra note 226, arts. 7
(“Except as specifically authorised in Article 16 of the Charter, this Treaty and
the Charter shall not be amended without the unanimous written agreement
of each of the Founders. . . .”), 9 (“This Treaty is executed in five original copies
by the Founders in the Tajik, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Russian and English languages.
. . .”), 11 (“This Treaty can be renounced by any Founding State in accordance
with its national legislation and with the approval of the Parliament. . . .”), 13
(“This Treaty may be executed in five counterparts, each of which shall be
deemed an original. . . .”), 2.13 (“‘Treaty’ means the Treaty of the Founders of
the University of Central Asia signed as of August 31, 2000 which is an inter-
national Treaty entered into among the Republic of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Re-
public, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Ismaili Imamat.”).
242. VCLT, supra note 19, art. 2.
243. See Treaty for the Establishment of the UCA, supra note 226, arts. 7, 8
(“All differences arising out of the implementation of this Treaty shall be re-
solved amicably. . . .”), 9, 11, 12 (“The Charter shall be an integral part of this
Treaty. . . .”), 13.
244. See id. pmbl. The preamble states:
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The text does not explicitly state whether the treaty qualifies as
such under the VCLT; and it may be that the states considered
the Imamat as a noncontracting, third-party (albeit a
“Founder”). An alternative understanding could be that all the
parties are equal actors and that the agreement is truly multi-
lateral. After all, the Aga Khan’s signing of the instrument is
atypical of a mere third-party beneficiary. The treaty can also be
contemplated as bilateral between the states on the one hand
and the Imamat on the other. If the Imamat was a third-party
beneficiary, then it would not necessarily need to be considered
an international legal person, though that possibility is not ex-
cluded. If the treaty was either multilateral or bilateral, how-
ever, the Imamat would need to be considered an international
legal person with at least functional treaty-making powers. The
Charter of the UCA, which is annexed to the treaty, simply says
that the agreement is an “international Treaty entered into
among the Republic of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Re-
public of Kazakhstan and the Ismaili Imamat.”245 The use of the
word “among” suggests a truly multilateral treaty among per-
sons with treaty-making powers. This may lead to the outcome
where at least several states in the world may consider the
Imamat an international legal person, at least insofar as the
UCA treaty is concerned.
Turning to the other international capacities, we find that,
generally, the Imamat is not considered an international legal
person. For example, the current Aga Khan and his predecessor
were parties to civil lawsuits, however, they have not, thus far,
This Treaty (the “Treaty”) is entered among: The Republic of
Tajikistan . . . The Kyrgyz Republic . . . ; and the Republic of
Kazakhstan Each of the foregoing Republics are hereinafter
collectively referred to as “the Founding States”; And The Is-
maili Imamat represented by his highness the Aga Khan the
49th Hereditary Imam of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims
(the “Ismaili Imamat”); The Founding States and the Ismaili
Imamat are hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Found-
ers.”
Id.
245. Treaty for the Establishment of the UCA, supra note 226, annex, Char-
ter of the University of Central Asia.
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claimed sovereign immunity.246 In addition, the Imamat does not
appear to engage in active and passive legation. The Aga Khan
is intimately involved in international politics247 and is accorded
considerable respect and attention in diplomatic circles,248 but
246. His Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan v. Nagib Tajdin et al., [2011] F.C.
14, ¶¶ 25, 58–59 (Can. F.C.) (observing that the Aga Kahn submitted himself
to a discovery interview and t that the Aga Khan authorized the lawsuit as a
plaintiff); Haji Bibi v. H. H. Sir Sultan Mahomad Shah Aga Khan, 2 Ind. Cas.
874 (1908) (India) (noting the ability of the Aga Khan to sue in his personal
capacity).
247. In February 2014, he was invited to address the Canadian House of
Commons. See Canada, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, 41st Parl., 2d
Sess., Vol. 147, No. 44 (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublica-
tions/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=6415231#Int-8223054.
248. See Cable No. 09KABUL3383_a, supra note 227, paras. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9. The
U.S Department of State held multiple meetings and diplomatic-level conver-
sations on the future of Afghanistan with respect to the Aga Khan. The discus-
sions included the following:
1. (C) Summary and Comment. The very well-informed Aga
Khan told assembled ambassadors 14 October that he had
met separately with President Karzai and leading opposition
candidate Abdullah Abdullah, and had told them that the po-
litical process in Afghanistan has failed. … With his access
and the high level of assistance the Aga Khan Development
Network (AKDN) affords to Afghanistan, the Aga Khan is a
serious voice that Afghans, including Hamid Karzai, respect
and listen to. . . .
3. (C) On 14 October the Aga Khan met with Ambassadors of
the United States (Eikenberry and Carney), France, UK, In-
dia, Pakistan, Germany, EU, and the Commander of Inter-
national Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). The Aga Khan’s
representative, Ali Mawji, organized the event. After presen-
tations by the assembled guests that generally emphasized
Afghanistan’s perilous security and political conditions, the
Aga Khan embarked on an informative tour d’ horizon, in-
cluding details of his suggestions following earlier meetings
with President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah. . . .
6. (C) The Aga Khan’s third point centered on the political
situation. The Aga Khan explained that he had solicited Kar-
zai’s and Abdullah’s views on the future of the country in the
face of a failed political process. He recounted that he had
advised both candidates that, regardless of the election out-
come, they should work together. . . .
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his precise legal authority fluctuates between quasi-governmen-
tal authority249 and unofficial capacity.250 The one representa-
tive office of the Imamat, located in Canada, carefully refers to
itself as a cultural “delegation” and not a political office.251 Part
8. (C) In his presentation, the Aga Khan mentioned his
awareness that the Afghan Constitution does not allow for a
prime minister; whatever position Abdullah would occupy
must be constitutional and must factor in parliamentary sen-
sitivities. . . . He took on board without comment the French
Ambassador’s suggestion that a “Senior Minister” be named
who could perform the role of a PM, without the title, but that
ensuring parliamentary acceptance would be vital.
9. (C) In response to questions and observations, the Aga
Khan noted that he does not favor changing the Constitution.
Id.
249. See Cable No. 06DUSHANBE402_a, supra note 226, para. 10; Five
Things to Know About the Aga Khan, RADIO FREEEUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Feb. 23,
2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/aga-khan-explainer/24686969.html (dis-
cussing that the Aga Khan is treated with “a certain degree of suspicion” or
“caution in some political circles in Tajikistan” because Gorno-Badakhshan au-
tonomous province is the only predominantly Ismaili region in the world, is
occasionally agitating for independence from Tajikistan, and “the local popula-
tions there have more faith in and respect for the Imam Aga Khan than for
President Emomali Rahmon”).
250. See Cable No. 06DUSHANBE402_a, supra note 226, para. 10 (reporting
that the Aga Khan was building a luxurious Ismaili Center in Tajikistan); U.S.
Dep’t of State, Afghanistan: All Systems (Still) Go for Former King’s Return,
Cable No. 02ROME1797_a, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 10, 2002), https://wik-
ileaks.org/plusd/cables/02ROME1797_a.html (reporting that the Aga Khan
loaned the airplane used by the former Afghan king’s son-in-law, who was ar-
ranging for the former king’s return to Afghanistan); U.S. Dep’t of State, Pri-
vate Trade Opportunity: Construction of Teaching Hospital, Cable No.
1974KARACH01414_b, WIKILEAKS para. 10 (July 5, 1974), https://www.wik-
ileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974KARACH01414_b.html (describing the “[p]roject
being built and financed by Aga Khan Hospital and Medical College, a chari-
table foundation in Pakistan supported by the wealthy international Muslim
sect called Ismaili led by His Highness, the Aga Khan”).
251. See Inauguration of the Delegation of the Ismaili Imamat in Ottawa,
Canada, AGA KHAN DEV. NETWORK (Dec. 6, 2008),
http://www.akdn.org/event/inauguration-delegation-ismaili-imamat-ottawa-
canada (noting that the Delegation will serve a representational role for the
Imamat and the Aga Khan Development Network’s nine nondenominational,
philanthropic, and development agencies); Jeff Davis, The Stately Launch of
the Ismaili Delegation, HILL TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.hilltimes.com/global/2012/09/16/the-stately-launch-of-the-ismaili-
delegation/27036.
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of the explanation for the international community’s treatment
of the Aga Khan may be due to his religious and traditional ca-
pacity but may also derive from his wealth and management of
the prominent NGO, the Aga Khan Development Network. This
suggests that the Imamat commands a certain degree of rever-
ence on the international plane but does not operate fully as an
international legal person, especially in comparison to the Holy
See. Thus, the functional analysis concludes that the Ismaili
Imamat is not an international legal person in the broadest
sense, although it may be treated as such from time to time on a
functional level.
F. The Individual
The last category for comparative purposes is the individual.
Historically, certain persons, usually members of royal
houses,252 but not exclusively so,253 were seen to have interna-
252. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Princess Dowager of Orange and the Elec-
tor of Brandenburg, Aug. 13, 1651, 2 Consol. T.S. 375; Treaty Between the
Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Neuburg, Oct. 11, 1651, 2 Consol. T.S.
383; Hereditary Agreement Between Members of the Ducal House of Saxony,
Apr. 22, 1657, 4 Consol. T.S. 275; Agreement Between the Dukes of Saxony,
Sept. 23, 1659, 5 Consol. T.S. 303; Agreement Between the Elector of Branden-
burg and the Princes of Anhalt, Jan. 7, 1681, 16 Consol. T.S. 47; Agreement
Between the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg, Oct. 10, 1687, 18 Con-
sol. T.S. 167; Monetary Agreement Between the Electors and Princes of the
Empire, Sept. 16, 1691, 19 Consol. T.S. 33. Although, now, royal family mem-
bers are considered to be nationals of their states or former states. See, e.g.,
Former King of Greece et al. v. Greece, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, 131–33, ¶
41; Austria Admin. Ct., Feb. 11, 1980, Case No. ZI 201 79, Habsburg-Lorraine
v. Austria (Austria), reprinted in 77 INT’L L. REP. 475, 485 (applying the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights to the Austrian passport application of the
son of the last Austrian Emperor).
253. See, e.g., Concordat Between the Abbess and Foundation of Quedlinburg
and the Elector of Saxony, Feb. 18, 1685, 17 Consol. T.S. 199; Agreement Be-
tween Brandenburg, Duke August of Saxony (as Administrator of Magdeburg)
and the Council of the City of Magdeburg, May 29, 1666, 9 Consol. T.S. 179;
Preliminary Agreement Pursuant to the Agreements of 1(11) February 1693
and 4(14) March 1694 for the Maintenance of the Harmony of the Empire etc.
Between the Bishop of Worms (also Head of the Teutonic Order), the Bishops
of Wurzburg, Constance and Munster, the Abbot of Fulda, the Duke of Saxe-
Gotha and Margrave of Baden-Durlach, the Dukes of Wolfenbuttel, the Land-
graves of Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, the Margrave of Baden-Baden,
the King of Denmark (as Duke of Holstein) and the House of Anhalt, Feb. 15,
1700, 22 Consol. T.S. 449; see also Paréage Creating Andorra, op cit.
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tional personality to conclude international agreements on eve-
rything from military arrangements (which are inherently
agreements under public law)254 to marriage and inheritance
(which are not, at least to modern observers).255 In many of these
cases, though, it is not entirely clear whether the person, as the
contracting entity, was acting in a private or public capacity of
the state. Such distinctions were not made before the wide-
spread expansion of democratic sovereignty many centuries
ago.256 Similarly, in an international agreement made by and in
the name of the Pope,257 rather than the Holy See or Vatican City
State, it is not completely clear whether it was the true intention
of the parties to bind the individual or the church as the inter-
national legal person. The treaties between Napoleon and the
King of France, in which Napoleon ceded authority back to the
254. See, e.g., Treaty of Defensive Alliance Between the German Princes,
Aug. 22, 1667, 10 Consol. T.S. 319; Defensive Armed Union Between the
Princes of the Empire (Wurzburg, Munster, Worms, Eichstadt, Saxe-Coburg,
Baden-Durlach, Brandenburg-Culmbach, Brandenburg-Onolzbach, Hesse-
Darmstadt, Denmark (Holstein), Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, Baden-Baden and
Saxe-Eisenach), July 15, 1700, 23 Consol. T.S. 35; Agreement Between the
Princes of the Empire in Opposition to the Ninth Electorate, July 1701, 23
Consol. T.S. 447.
255. See, e.g., Inheritance Agreement Between the Elector and the Margrave
of Brandenburg, Mar. 3, 1692, 19 Consol. T.S. 397; Matrimonial Treaty Be-
tweenMaximilian Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, and John III, King of Poland,
in the Name of His Daughter, the Princess Theresa Cunegunda, Bavaria-Po-
land, May 19, 1694, 20 Consol. T.S. 369; Treaty for the Marriage of King John
V and the Archduchess Maria Anna, Between the Emperor and Portugal, June
24, 1708, 26 Consol. T.S. 185 [hereinafter Treaty for the Marriage of King John
V and the Archduchess Maria Anna].
256. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Palatinate, the Dukes of Brunswick-
Wolffenbüttel, Brunswick-Zell and Wurtemberg, and the Landgraves of Hesse-
Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, Apr. 17, 1662, 7 Consol. T.S. 131; Postal Treaty
Between Prussia and Thurn and Taxis, May 22, 1722, 31 Consol. T.S. 375;
Agreement Between Hamburg and the House of Holstein, May 27, 1768, 44
Consol. T.S. 187; Treaty for the Marriage of King John V and the Archduchess
Maria Anna, supra note 255; Treaty of Confederation of the States of the Rhine
(France, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Mayence, Baden etc.), July 12, 1806, 58 Consol.
T.S. 459; Accord Between the Archduke Leopold of Austria (as Grand Master
of the Teutonic Order) and the Netherlands, June 14, 1662, 7 Consol. T.S. 181;
see also JACQUES-ANTOINEDULAURE, 6 HISTOIRE DEPARIS 298 (1834) (citing the
French King’s Address to the Parliament of Paris of April 13, 1655, in which
he uttered the famous, and likely apocryphal quote, “L’état c’est moi”).
257. See Agreement Between Hanover and the Pope, Mar. 26, 1824, 74 Con-
sol. T. S. 111.
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historic French dynasty, appear to be personal treaties,258 and in
light of precedent are not so surprising, though perhaps they
were already anachronistic by the time of their conclusion. From
a historical perspective, therefore, it is not surprising that inter-
national legal personality for sovereign (and comparable) indi-
viduals was phased out of practice in contemporary interna-
tional law.259 Now, however, questions are being raised regard-
ing whether every individual has some capacity for international
personality.
Some scholars now argue that international law is evolving to
embrace the individual. 260 Even in interstate disputes, the con-
258. See Treaty of Fontainebleau, Apr. 11, 1814, translated in 1 ALPHONSE
MARIE LOUIS DE LAMARTINE, THE HISTORY OF THE RESTORATION OF MONARCHY
INFRANCE 201–06 (1854) (“His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon on the one part,
and their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia,
the Emperor of all the Russians, and the King of Prussia, stipulating in their
own names, as well as in that of all the allies, on the other. . . .”).
259. Thus, contemporary treaties in the name of the monarch are always re-
garded as being in effect in the name of the state. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST,
MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 19 (3d ed. 2013).
260. See THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(2006) (describing the impact of human rights and humanitarian law on many
other parts of international law and asserting that “[t]he humanization of pub-
lic international law under the impact of human rights has shifted its focus
above all from State-centered to individual-centered”). International human
rights law bestows individuals with a panoply of rights. See American Conven-
tion on Human Rights arts. 4, 5, 6, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; ICCPR,
supra note 47, arts. 18, 21; ICESCR, supra note 47, arts. 6, 11, 15. Also, indi-
viduals have standing to pursue claims against states for violating human
rights treaties. See, e.g., Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-0/79) (1979); ECHR, supra note 189, arts. 1–18;
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Estab-
lishment of an African Court of Human and People’s Rights art. 5, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT.1.rev2 (1997) (entered into force Jan. 25,
2004).
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cern for and protection of the individual is increasingly im-
portant.261 Certainly, individuals can violate international crim-
inal law.262 In addition, the U.N. Security Council has issued res-
olutions directly imposing obligations on individuals under in-
ternational law.263 Furthermore, individuals have been granted
rights directly under international law, for example, in human
rights treaties and bilateral investment treaties.264Surely, inter-
national law contemplates that individuals can bear duties and
rights directly under international law, but what remains un-
clear is whether all individuals have the kind of capacity that
ancient sovereigns have had to enjoy a wider scope of interna-
tional legal personality. In Prosecutor v. Karadžić, the defendant
argued that he had reached an agreement with Richard
261. SeeQuestions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg.
v. Sen.), Request for the Indication of Provision Measures, Order, 2009 I.C.J.
Rep. 139, ¶ 21 (May 28) (dissenting opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.). Justice
Trindade noted:
Nostalgics of the past, entrapped in their own dogmatism,
can hardly deny that, nowadays, States litigating before this
Court, despite its inter-State contentious procedure, have
conceded that they have no longer the monopoly of the rights
to be preserved, and, much to their credit, they recognize so,
in pleading before this Court on behalf also of individuals,
their nationals, or even in a larger framework, their inhabit-
ants.
Id.
262. See United States v. Goering et al., in XXII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THENUREMBERGMILITARY TRIBUNALS [T.W.C.] 466 (1947).
263. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 1 (Sept. 24, 2014) (“[A]ll foreign terrorist fight-
ers [must] disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in the con-
flict.”); see also S.C. Res. 814 (Mar. 26, 1993); S.C. Res. 1010 (Aug. 10, 1995);
S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203
(Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 1306 (July 5, 2000); S.C. Res. 1333 (Dec. 19, 2000)
(creating a committee for imposing sanctions on individuals); S.C. Res. 1474
(Apr. 8, 2003) (addressing potential obligations of “States and other actors”);
S.C. Res. 2000 (July 27, 2011). But see S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (limiting
the obligations to control individuals’ acts to states only); S.C. Res. 1343 (Mar.
7, 2001); S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); S.C. Res. 1624 (Sept. 14, 2005); S.C.
Res. 1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 2136 (Jan. 30, 2014).
264. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v.
Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990), 6 ICSID
Rev. 526 (1991) (rendering an award in the first investor arbitration claim case
of its kind brought under a bilateral investment treaty).
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Holbrooke, the U.N. envoy on the Bosnian peace process, which
provided Karadžić with immunity and protection against prose-
cution. While Karadžić failed to prove the existence of the agree-
ment, Karadžić seems to suggest that, had it been produced, the
agreement would have been valid under international law.265
This claim, while dubious, reflects ancient practice. Some schol-
ars argue that individuals, or at least collective groups of indi-
viduals in the sense of civil society, should contribute to the for-
mation of customary international law instead of or alongside
the state.266 Some even assert that the individual is the only orig-
inal, natural person in international law,267 which harkens back
to the skepticism over the distinction between original and de-
rived personality. Once again, practice evolves to address the
“requirements of international life,” with individuals occasion-
ally enjoying a functional, relative degree of personality.268 Our
conclusion must be that the existence and degree of interna-
tional legal personality in individuals is fluctuating and relative
depending on the state of international law and the needs of the
international community, which potentially keeps the door open
for future expansion of personality.
CONCLUSION
Some scholars argue that personality, as a notion, should ef-
fectively be abandoned in favor of a new way to think about ac-
tors in international law.269 This perspective is attractive and
265. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on the Ac-
cused’s Holbrooke Agreement Motion (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia July 8, 2009); Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, De-
cision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chapter’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke
Agreement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 12, 2009).
266. See Legal Consequences for Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia, 1971 I.CJ. at 69–70, 74 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.); Western Sa-
hara, 1975 I.C.J. at 100 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.).
267. See NIJMAN, supra note 1, at 243, 457–73; cf. Thomas Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992).
268. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. at 179; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. at 78–79, 198 (dissenting opinion by Koroma) (“I agree
with the Court that because of the necessities of international life, it is accepted
that international organizations can exercise implied powers, which are not in
conflict with their constitution and are required to ensure their effectiveness.”).
269. See, e.g., ROSALYNHIGGINS, PROBLEMS ANDPROCESS: INTERNATIONALLAW
ANDHOWWEUSE IT 49–51 (1999).
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can certainly be considered, but, for now, personality retains an
important status. The difficulty is that the rights of personality
are fragmenting, and the international community needs to de-
velop a coherent understanding of how to identify and draw con-
sequences from personality.
The preceding survey of the various ways that personality is
understood in international law suggests that the common
thread is one of functionality. International organizations are
the most obvious entity based on functional existence, but we
also find quasi-international organizations may be treated as if
they were international organizations depending on their func-
tion. Additionally, the article observes that other collective enti-
ties, such as corporations and NGOs, as well as singular entities
(individuals), similarly enjoy aspects of international legal per-
sonality based on how they function within the international le-
gal order. Some of these entities, such as NLMs, indigenous peo-
ples, or insurgents, have some kind of territorial existence, and
their personality blurs into statehood. The most obvious of these
is the collective triumvirate of the PLO, the Palestinian Author-
ity, and the state of Palestine. In each of these cases, the distinc-
tion between being an international legal person and being
treated as an international legal person dissolves, and we are
left with relative rights and duties as the basis for or manifesta-
tion of personality.
The dominant paradigm of the functionalist premise for the
law of international organizations assumes that organizations
fulfill functions, in that they are cooperative endeavors between
states.270 For the other entities in this article, however, there
was a similar political choice to view the entity as fulfilling a
similarly important function, and treat the entity as having per-
sonality for that purpose. On this basis, this article concludes
that questionable entities may be regarded as relative interna-
tional legal persons depending on the function at issue. For ex-
ample, insurgents have personality as a basis for the application
of international humanitarian law, NGOs have personality in
order to insulate them from state politics, and certain religious
organizations have personality for the promotion of the religious
mission. In this way, the functionalist, analytical approach that
270. See Klabbers, supra note 2, at 645.
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forms the core of the theory of the law of international organiza-
tions is also the preferred approach to assessing the personality
of questionable entities in the international legal system.
Perhaps then it is time to retire the notion of the monolithic,
singular status of the international legal person and instead rec-
ognize that personality is essentially a status of holding rights
and duties, and that rights and duties fluctuate based on func-
tions. We might still place states in a special category as the
grantors of rights, but we need to acknowledge that other enti-
ties are increasingly enjoying relative personality based on their
functions.
